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ARISTOTELIAN ASSERTORIC SYLLOGISTIC1
MOHAMED A. AMER
To Raouf Doss Who introduced modern logic to Egypt
Abstract. Aristotelian assertoric syllogistic, which is currently
of growing interest, has attracted the attention of the founders
of modern logic, who approached it in several (semantical and
syntactical) ways. Further approaches were introduced later on.
These approaches (with few exceptions) are here discussed, de-
veloped and interrelated.
Among other things, different facets of soundness, complete-
ness, decidability and independence are investigated. Specifically
arithmetization (Leibniz), algebraization (Leibniz and Boole), and
Venn models (Euler and Venn) are closely examined. All proofs
are simple. In particular there is no recourse to maximal nor
minimal conditions (with only one, dispensable, exception), which
makes the long awaited deciphering of the enigmatic Leibniz char-
acteristic numbers possible. The problem was how to look at
matters from the right perspective.
Introduction. Aristotelian assertoric syllogistic (henceforth AAS), which
is currently of growing interest (Glashoff 2005), has attracted the attention
of the founders of modern logic. Leibniz, Boole, De Morgan, Venn, Peirce,
Frege, Hilbert, Russell and Gödel all dealt with it. For some of them it was
the starting point (cf. Boole 1948).
Modern treatment of AAS started closer to what may be currently called
the semantical or model theoretic approach. This was threefold: arthimetical,
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algebraic, and diagramatic (or set theoretic). The first trend was developed
by Leibniz (Łukasiewicz 1998, pp. 126-9; Kneale and Kneale 1966, pp. 337-
8; Glashoff 2002; and Sotirov 2015). The second was developed by Leibniz
(Kneale and Kneale 1966, pp. 338-45; Lenzen 2004) and after about two
centuries was again developed by Boole (1948), without mentioning the work
of Leibniz. The last trend was developed by Euler, then by Venn (Venn 1880).
With the rise of proof theory late nineteenth century, six syntactical for-
malizations of AAS were developed:
(i) Monadic first order formalization which goes back to Frege (1967, on p.28
the square of logical opposition may be found). This formalization is
adopted by Hilbert and Ackermann (1950, pp. 44-54).
(ii) Sentential formalization which goes back to Peirce (Bellucci and Pietari-
nen 2016, p. 226) and is adopted by Gödel (Adzic and Dosen 2016,
p. 479). The most elaborate study of this formalization is that of
Łukasiewicz (1998).
(iii) Dyadic first order formalization which goes back to Shepherdson (1956).
The novel idea of regarding categorical sentences (or propositions) as
binary relational sentences (or propositions) is due to De Morgan (Va-
lencia 2004, pp. 506-7).
It is worthwile to note here that, according to Bocheński (1968, pp. 68-
70), Aristotle dealt with the logic of relations among other topics which
Bocheński (1968) puts (p. 63) collectively under the title “Non-analytical
laws and rules”, to be distinguished from syllogisms such as those considered
in this article, which Bocheński (1968) terms (p. 42) “analytic”.
(iv) Natural deduction formalization which goes back to Corcoran (1972)
and Smiley (1973).
(v) First order many-sorted formalization which goes back to Smiley (1962).
(vi) A recent formalization based on Hilbert’s epsilon and tau quantifiers
(Pasquali and Retoré 2016).
All of the above will be considered below with only two exceptions. The
first is the many-sorted formalization ((v) above), for it is a variant of the
monadic first order formalization mentioned in (i) above; moreover it was,
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apparently, abandoned even by its own author (cf. Smiley 1973). The formal-
ization based on Hilbert’s epsilon and tau quantifiers ((vi) above) will take
us far off the current mainstream of logic. So it will be the second exception
and will not be further considered here, though it may have intrinsic merit
especially for those who are interested in formalizing natural languages.
With only one exception, the modern syntactical formalizations of AAS
degraded it to the rank of a secondary logic, a subordinate or a subsidiary
sublogic of a superior fundamental or principal primary logic. In contrast,
the natural deduction formalization ((iv) above, cf. Bocheński (1968, pp. 3,
31, 42, 49, 52)) rehabilitates it to a full-fledged primary logic, as was probably
designed by its founder: Aristotle, and as was taken for granted for over two
millennia. Accordingly, this formalization will be the focus of this article.
Through completeness we shall see that as far as the basic sentences (to be
defined in 1.6 below) are concerned other formalizations add nothing new.
In the sequel we deal -from modern standpoints- with AAS, not with me-
dieval nor traditional syllogistic. In contrast to Boole (1948), Glashoff (2007),
Hilbert and Ackermann (1950), Russinoff (1999), Shepherdson (1956) and
Sotirov (1999), term negation (or complementation, to use a modern term;
cf. Bocheński (1968, p. 50)) is not here permitted. Also, in contrast to
Hilbert and Ackermann (1950), Łukasiewicz (1998), Shumann (2006), Shep-
herdson (1956) and Sotirov (1999), Boolean combinations of categorical sen-
tences are not here permitted. So (the extensional aspect of) AAS will be
just the logic of, or the fragment of set theory which deals with, inclusion
(universal affirmative sentences) and exclusion (universal negative sentences)
and their contradictories (particular sentences). However, some exceptions
may be appropriate as will be clear, or clarified, at the proper places.
Among other things, different facets of soundness, completeness, decid-
ability, and independence are investigated. Particularly arithmetization (Leib-
niz), algebraization (Leibniz and Boole) and Venn models (Euler and Venn)
are closely examined.
All proofs given here are simple. In contrast to Corcoran (1972), Glashoff
(2010), Martin (1997), Shepherdson (1956), Smiley (1973) and Smith (1983),
our proofs have no recourse to maximal nor minimal principles nor conditions
(with only one exception, which is indirect and may be dispensed with). This
makes the long awaited deciphering of the enigmatic Leibniz characteristic
numbers possible. The problem was how to look at matters from the right
perspective.
To specify, in section 3 below we provide a polynomial time algorithm to
3
decide for any finite set of categorical sentences whether it is consistent and,
if it is, to assign a Leibniz model (to be defined below) to it. This settles
positively problem 2 of Glashoff (2002) for finite sets. The general case is
discussed in section 2.
I hope that the simplicity of this exposition of AAS will help to re-
incorporate it into the mainstream of mathematical logic.
After this introduction, the structure of the rest of the article is as follows:
1. Formalizations of AAS
2. Semantics of AAS
3. Decidability
4. Basic equivalence of the four formalizations
5. Venn soundness and completeness
6. Direct way to Venn models
7. Variations on NF (C)
8. Direct completion of direct deduction
9. Models of NF (C) revisited
10. Decidability revisited
11. Sorites
12. Independence
13. Algebraic semantics of AAS, a prelude
14. Algebraic interpretation of NF (C)
15. Annihilators: Embedding the partial into a total
16. Back to algebraic interpretation
17. Leibniz and Boole
18. Inadequacy: bounds of AAS
Acknowledgements
Appendix
1. Formalizations of AAS. Formalizations of AAS differ with regard
to permitting the subject and the predicate of a formal symbolic categorical
sentence (henceforth categorical sentence) to be the same. Smith (1983) and
Glashoff (2010) follow Corcoran (1972) in not permitting sameness; as accom-
modating sameness “would entail rather more deviation from the Aristotelian
text” says Corcoran (1972, p. 696).
On the other hand Smiley (1973) left the door open for permitting same-
ness, noting (p. 144) that “the variables he [Aristotle] uses for the major,
middle and minor terms are all distinct from one another [...]; though when it
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comes to substituting actual terms in the resulting forms we are of course at
liberty to replace different variables by the same term (64a1).”. Consequently,
it seems that Aristotle excluded sameness, for technical -not philosophical-
reasons. This is, possibly, why Łukasiewicz (1998) adopted sameness (see pp.
77, 88); while Martin (1997) simultaneously considered two systems, one of
them is permitting sameness and the other is not.
In conformity with the current mainstream of mathematical logic, same-
ness is here permitted. Excluding sameness, and other variations, will be
considered in section 7 below.
1.1. Monadic first order formalization of AAS. The languge here
is a standard first order language, with or without equality, whose set P of
non-logical constants has at least three elements, and all of its elements are
unary relational symbols. In the sequel “P ”, “Q” and “R” will be metalin-
guistic variables ranging over the elements of P. With abuse of notation, “P”
will denote this language too.
ABBREVIATIONS 1.1.
“APQ” is an abbreviation for “∀x(Px→ Qx)”
“EPQ” is an abbreviation for “∀x(Px→qQx)”
“IPQ” is an abbreviation for “∃x(Px ∧Qx)”
“OPQ” is an abbreviation for “∃x(Px∧qQx)”
DEFINITION 1.2. MF (P) is the theory based on P with only one non
-logical axiom schema, namely, APQ → IQP (which is equivalent to the
schema ∃x Px).
PROPOSITION 1.3. The following are theorem schemata of MF (P):
1. EPQ↔ q IPQ 2. OPQ↔qAPQ
3. APP 4. APQ→ IQP
5. EPQ→ EQP 6. APQ ∧ AQR→ APR
7. APQ ∧ EQR→ EPR
Proof. Routine. 
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1.2. Sentential formalization of AAS. The symbols “A”, “E”, “I”
and “O” were made use of in section 1.1, in this section they will be made
use of differently. This abuse of notation is benign as long as the intended
denotation is clear from the context, so it will be here permitted. Such abuses
of notation may be permitted later on without further notice.
Let J be a set (whose elements are to correspond to categorical constants)
having at least three elements, let A,E, I and O be four injective functions
of pairwise disjoint ranges, each of domain J×J , and let AS(J) be the union
of their ranges. In the sequel “i”, “j” and “k” will be metalinguistic variables
ranging over the elements of J .
The language here is a standard sentential language whose set of senten-
tial symbols is AS(J). With abuse of notation “J” will denote this language
too.
DEFINITION 1.4. SF (J) is the theory based on J with the following non -
logical axiom schemata:
1. Eij ↔qIij 2. Oij ↔qAij
3. Aii 4. Aij → Iji
5. Eij → Eji 6. Aij ∧ Ajk → Aik
7. Aij ∧ Ejk → Eik
The proof machinery is modus ponens together with any standard set of
sentential logical axiom schemata.
REMARK 1.5. There are two kinds of substitution: sentences for sentences
and indices for indices. Each may be permitted, under some conditions, as
a derived rule of inference (cf. Łukasiewiez 1998, p. 88; see section 1.5 below).
1.3. Dyadic first order formalization of AAS. The language here is
a standard first order language, with or without, equality whose non-logical
constants are four binary relation symbols “A”,“E”,“I” and “O”, together with
a set C of individual (or categorical) constants having at least three elements.
In the sequel “a”, “b”, and “c” will be metalinguistic variables ranging over
the elements of C. With abuse of notation “C” will denote this language too.
DEFINITION 1.6. DF (C) is the theory based on C whose non-logical ax-
ioms are the universal closures of:
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1. Exy ↔qIxy 2. Oxy ↔qAxy
3. Axx 4. Axy → Iyx
5. Exy → Eyx 6. Axy ∧Ayz → Axz
7. Axy ∧ Eyz → Exz
1.4. Natural deduction formalization of AAS. The language here
is a sublanguage of the language defined in 1.3. The alphabet is the four
binary relation symbols A,E, I and O, together with a set C of individual
(or categorical) constants having at least three elements. The sentences are
the equality free atomic sentences of 1.3., viz. a sentence is a string Y ab
where Y ∈ {A,E, I, O} and a, b ∈ C. By abuse of notation “C” will denote
this language too, and the set of all sentences will be denoted by “S(C)”.
In the sequel “α”, “β”, “γ”, “δ”, “σ” and “ρ” will be metalinguistic variables
ranging over the elements of S(C).
Sentences starting with A or E are called universal, those starting with I
or O are called particular. Also, sentences starting with A or I are called affir-
mative, those starting with E or O are called negative. ForW ∈ {A,E, I, O},
sentences starting with W are called W -sentences.
DEFINITION 1.7. NF (C) is the logical system based on the language C
with the following deduction rules (or enrichments thereof, see sections 8
and 11 below):
0.
Aaa
(A-Id) 1. Aab
Iba
(Apc)
2. Eab
Eba
(Ec) 3. Aab,Abc
Aac
(Barbara)
4. Aab,Ebc
Eac
(Celarent).
“Barbara” and “Celarent” are, respectively, the medieval names of the
rules 3 and 4; “A-Id”, “Apc” and “Ec” are, respectively, abbreviations for
“A-identity”, “A-partial conversion” and “E-conversion”. For simplicity, we
may write “rules” instead of “deduction rules”.
DEFINITION 1.8. A direct deduction (or d-deduction) of σ(∈ S(C)) from
Γ(⊆ S(C)) is a sequence < ρi >i∈k (k ∈ N
+) such that ρk−1 = σ and for each
i ∈ k, σi ∈ Γ or is the consequent of some rule of NF (C) whose antecedents
are previous terms of the sequence. In this case we write Γ
d
⊢ σ, and σ is said
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to be a direct consequence (or theorem) of Γ. Also < ρi >i∈k is said to be a
direct (or d-) deduction from Γ. From now on, the rules 0-4 given above will
be called also “d-rules”.
Regarding the current mainstream of mathematical logic, this definition is
a typical definition. In contrast, corresponding definitions given in Corcoran
(1972), Glashoff (2010), Martin (1997), Smiley (1973) and Smith (1983) are
atypical, each has its own peculiarity.
To get closer to the Aristotelian tradition, a more restricted definition of
direct deduction is presented in section 11 below, and its relationship to the
above one is investigated there.
As usual, the contradictory σ̂ of σ(∈ S(C)) is defined as follows:
Âab = Oab Êab = Iab Îab = Eab Ôab = Aab
so ̂̂σ = σ.
A set Γ(⊆ S(C)) is said to be d-inconsistent (or d-contradictory) if Γ
d
⊢ σ
and Γ
d
⊢ σ̂, for some σ ∈ S(C); otherwise Γ is said to be d-consistent.
DEFINITION 1.9. The general (or g-) deduction relation
g
⊢ (⊆ ℘(S(C)) ×
S(C)) is defined as follows:
Γ
g
⊢ σ iff Γ ∪ {σ̂} is d-inconsistent.
For Γ ⊆ S(C), “Γ is g-inconsistent (or g-contradictory)” and “Γ is g-
consistent” may be defined along the above lines, replacing “d” by “g”. Ob-
viously
d
⊢ ⊆
g
⊢, so if Γ(⊆ S(C)) is d-inconsistent, it is g-inconsistent.
For e ∈ {d, g} and Γ ⊆ S(C), “Γe” will denote the closure of Γ under
e
⊢,
i.e.
Γe= the smallest ∆ ⊆ S(C) such that Γ ⊆ ∆ and for every σ ∈ S(C),
σ ∈ ∆ whenever ∆
e
⊢ σ.
LEMMA 1.10. Let Σ,Σ′ be subsets of S(C) such that for every σ ∈ Σ,
Σ′
d
⊢ σ. For every d-deduction < ρi >i∈k from Σ, there are a k
′(≥ k), a
d-deduction < ρ′i >i∈k′ from Σ
′ and a strictly increasing function f : k → k′
such that f(k − 1) = k′ − 1 and for every i ∈ k, ρi = ρ
′
f(i). Hence for every
α ∈ S(C), Σ′
d
⊢ α whenever Σ
d
⊢ α.
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Proof. By induction on ℓ, the number of times of making use in < ρi >i∈k of
assumptions from Σ.
Basis: ℓ = 0; take k′ = k,< ρ′i >i∈k′ = < ρi >i∈k and f the identity
function on k.
Induction step: assume the required for ℓ = m. Let ℓ = m + 1 and let
j(∈ k) be the last line in which an assumption from Σ is made use of. The
case j = 0 is easier than the case j > 0, so we shall deal only with the latter.
By the induction hypothesis, there are a j′(≥ j), a deduction < αi >i∈j′,
from Σ′ and a strictly increasing function g : j → j′ such that g(j−1) = j′−1
and for every i ∈ j, ρi = αg(i).
Let < βi >i∈m be a deduction of ρj from Σ
′. Put:
k′ = j′ +m+ k − j − 1,
γi = ρi+j+1 for i ∈ k − j − 1,
< ρ′i >i∈k′=< αi >i∈j′⌢ < βi >i∈m⌢ < γi >i∈k−j−1,
where “⌢” is the concatenation operation symbol.
Evidently k′ ≥ k. The completion of the proof is now easy. 
Parts 3 and 4 of the next proposition are, respectively, reformulations of
lemmata M1 and M2 of Corcoran (1972).
PROPOSITION 1.11. Let Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ S(C), Γ′ = {ρ ∈ S(C) : Γ
g
⊢ ρ},
U ∈ {A,E},W ∈ {I, O}, e ∈ {d, g} and a, b, c ∈ C, then:
1. Γd = {ρ ∈ S(C) : Γ
d
⊢ ρ}.
2. If Γ ∪ {Wab}
d
⊢ σ and σ 6= Wab, then Γ
d
⊢ σ.
3. If Γ is d-consistent, then Γ
g
⊢ Uab iff Γ
d
⊢ Uab.
4. Γ is d-consistent iff it is g-consistent.
5. If ρ ∈ Γ′ and Γ, ρ
g
⊢ σ, then Γ
g
⊢ σ.
6. Γ′g = Γ′, hence Γg = Γ′.
7. Γee = Γe; hence, for every d-rule r, if each antecedent of r belongs to
Γe, then so also does its consequent.
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Proof.
1. The required is a corollary of the above lemma.
2. Generalizing upon the metalinguistic variable “σ”, the resulting sen-
tence may be proved by course of values induction on the length of the
d-deduction from Γ∪ {Wab}, noticing that Wab is not a premise of any rule
of NF (C).
3. Let Γ
g
⊢ Uab, then for some α ∈ S(C), Γ, Ûab
d
⊢ α, α̂. So, by part 2, if
Γ is d-consistent then Ûab ∈ {α, α̂}, then Uab ∈ {α, α̂}. So, by part 2 again,
Γ
d
⊢ Uab. The other direction is obvious.
4. Let Γ be d-consistent and g-inconsistent, then there is a universal
α ∈ S(C) such that Γ
g
⊢ α, α̂, then by part 3, Γ
d
⊢ α. Also there is β ∈ S(C)
such that Γ, α
d
⊢ β, β̂, so, by lemma 1.10., Γ
d
⊢ β, β̂, hence Γ is d-inconsistent.
Consequently, if Γ is g-inconsistent it is d-inconsistent. The other direction
is obvious.
5. Obvious if Γ is d-inconsistent, so let Γ be d-consistent and let ρ ∈ Γ′ and
Γ, ρ
g
⊢ σ. There is α ∈ S(C) such that Γ, ρ, σ̂
d
⊢ α, α̂. If ρ is universal, then
by part 3 and lemma 1.10, Γ, σ̂
d
⊢ α, α̂. Also, if ρ is particular and ρ /∈ {α, α̂},
then by part 2, Γ, σ̂
d
⊢ α, α̂. In both cases Γ
g
⊢ σ. In the remaining case ρ
must be particular and Γ, ρ, σ̂
d
⊢ ρ, ρ̂, then by part 2, Γ, σ̂
d
⊢ ρ̂. But there
is β ∈ S(C) such that Γ, ρ̂
d
⊢ β, β̂, then Γ, σ̂
d
⊢ β, β̂, hence Γ
g
⊢ σ, which
completes the proof.
6. By induction, part 5 may be generalized to: for every finite ∆ ⊆ Γ′,
Γ
g
⊢ σ whenever Γ∪∆
g
⊢ σ. From this it readily follows that Γ
g
⊢ σ whenever
Γ′
g
⊢ σ, hence the result.
7. By part 1 and lemma 1.10, Γdd = Γd, and by part 6, Γgg = Γ′g = Γ′ =
Γg. To prove the last clause, let r be a d-rule. If each antecedent of r be-
longs to Γe, then its consequent belongs to Γee = Γe. 
In view of part 4 of the above proposition, for e ∈ {d, g}, the prefix “e-”
may be deleted from “e-consistent”, “e-inconsistent” and “e-contradictory”.
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1.5. Equality / equivalence. For Γ ⊆ S(C), e ∈ {d, g} and a, b ∈ C,
Γ
e
⊢ Aab, Aba is equivalent to each of:
1. Γ
e
⊢ Aac iff Γ
e
⊢ Abc all c ∈ C,
2. Γ
e
⊢ Aca iff Γ
e
⊢ Acb all c ∈ C.
Thus, Γ
e
⊢ Aab, Aba imply the substitutability of a, b for each other in
universal positive sentences. This will be generalized below to all universal
sentences, respectively all sentences, for e = d, respectively e = g. The last
generalization is the essence of equality (congruence or equivalence, depend-
ing on the situation). It holds, in the respective appropriate forms, for the
other formalizations as is shown in the following:
THEOREM 1.12.
1. Let P,Q ∈P, then:
MF (P) ⊢ (APQ∧AQP )→ (ϕ↔ ϕ′) for every form ϕ of P, where ϕ′ is
a form obtained from ϕ by substituting some occurrences of “P (x)” in ϕ by
“Q(x)”, or vice versa.
2. Let i, j ∈ J , then:
SF (J) ⊢ (Aij ∧ Aji) → (α ↔ α′) for every sentence α of J , where α′ is
a sentence obtained from α by substituting some occurrences of “i” in α by
“j”, or vice versa.
3. Let a, b ∈ C, then:
DF (C) ⊢ (Aab ∧ Aba) → (ϕ ↔ ϕ′) for every form ϕ of C, where ϕ′ is a
form obtained from ϕ by substituting some occurrences of “a” in ϕ by “b”, or
vice versa; provided -for languages with equality- no substitution takes place
in a form or a subform of the form t = t′, where t and t′ are terms.
4. Let Γ ⊆ S(C), e ∈ {d, g} and a, b ∈ C, and let Γ
e
⊢ Aab, Aba, then for
all c ∈ C:
Γ
e
⊢ Y ac iff Γ
e
⊢ Y bc and Γ
e
⊢ Y ca iff Γ
e
⊢ Y cb, where Y ∈ {A,E}, {AE, I, O}
for e = d, g respectively.
Proof. The first three parts may be proved by the standard methods devel-
oped in the respective formal systems.
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For the last part, part 7 of proposition 1.11 secures the required for e ∈
{d, g} and Y ∈ {A,E}.
It remains to consider the cases where e = g and Y ∈ {I, O}. If Γ is
inconsistent the required follows by the definition of
g
⊢, so let Γ be consis-
tent. Assume Γ
g
⊢ Aab, Aba and Γ
g
⊢ Ica, then by part 3 of proposition 1.11,
Γ
d
⊢ Aab, Aba, hence Γ, Ecb
d
⊢ Eca. But there is α ∈ S(C) such that Γ,
Eca
d
⊢ α, α̂, consequently Γ, Ecb
d
⊢ α, α̂ and, by definition, Γ
g
⊢ Icb. The
other cases are similar or easier. 
1.6. Basic sentences. In each of the four formalizations MF (P),
SF (J), DF (C) and NF (C) the sentences to be made use of in the Aris-
totelian syllogistic will be called basic (or categorical) sentences. The sets of
basic sentences will be denoted, respectively, by “BM(P)”, “BS(J)”, “BD(C)”
and “BN(C)”. That is:
BM(P) = {Y PQ : Y ∈ {A,E, I, O} and P,Q ∈P}.
BS(J) = AS(J) (= the set of all atomic sentences of J).
BD(C) = the set of all (equality free) atomic sentences of C.
BN(C) = S(C) (= BD(C)).
1.7. Interpretation. Let h : C → J , with abuse of notation (no
confusion will ensue) we define another function h : BN(C) → BS(J)
by h(Y ab) = Y hahb, for Y ∈ {A,E, I, O} and a, b ∈ C. As usual, for
Γ ⊆ BN(C), the image of Γ under h is denoted by “h(Γ)”; also we may
write “Y hab”, “Γh” for “h(Y ab)”, “h(Γ)” respectively. The function h is said
to be an interpretation of BN(C) in BS(J). Similarly BM(P), BS(J) and
BN(C) (= BD(C)) may be interpreted in each other.
PROPOSITION 1.13. Let Γ∪{σ} ⊆ BN(C), let h and H be interpretations
of BN(C) in BS(J) and BM(P) respectively, and let < Γ′, σ′, σ̂′, T >∈ {<
Γ, σ, σ̂, DF (C) >, < Γh, σh, σ̂h, SF (J) >, < ΓH , σH , σ̂H ,MF (P) >}. Then:
1. T ⊢ σ̂′ ↔qσ′,
2. T ∪ Γ′ ⊢ σ′ whenever Γ
g
⊢ σ.
Proof.
1. Easy.
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2. By proposition 1.3 for T =MF (P), and by the definitions for the other
cases. 
PROPOSITION 1.14. Let T ∈ {MF (P), DF (C)}, let h be an interpretation
of BS(J) in the set of basic sentences of T , and let Γ∪{σ} ⊆ BS(J). Then:
T ∪ Γh ⊢ σh whenever SF (J) ∪ Γ ⊢ σ.
Proof. The interpretations of the axioms of SF (J) are theorems of T , and
the proof machinery of T is not weaker than that of SF (J). 
To investigate the converses of proposition 1.14 and part 2 of proposition
1.13, we first go to:
2. Semantics of AAS. The theoriesMF (P) and DF (C) are first order,
and the theory SF (J) is sentential; so each has its usual class of models with
respect to which it is sound and complete.
2.1. Models of MF (P). A model B of MF (P) is an ordered pair
< B, µ > where B is a non-empty set and µ maps P into ℘(B)− {φ}. B is
called the universe, or the base, of B and may be denoted also by “ |B|”.
2.2. Models of SF (J). A model B of SF (J) is a mapping form AS(J)
into 2 (= {0, 1}), which satisfies all the axioms of SF (J). For σ ∈ S(J),
B  σ means that σ takes the value 1 under the usual extension of B.
2.3. Models of DF (C). A structure B of the dyadic language C (or a
DF (C)-structure B) is a 6-tuple < B,A∗, E∗, I∗, O∗, µ > where B is a non-
empty set and A∗, E∗, I∗ and O∗ are binary relations on B corresponding to
the relation symbols “A”,“E”,“I” and “O” respectively, and µ is a mapping
of C into B. B is called the universe, or the base, of B and may be denoted
also by “ |B|”. B is a model of DF (C) if it satisfies its axioms.
Since, by axioms 1 and 2, E∗ = I∗c and O∗ = A∗c (where “c” denotes
the complement with respect to B × B) we may -by abuse of notation-
say that < B,A∗, I∗, µ > is a model of DF (C) whenever the expansion
< B,A∗, I∗c, I∗, A∗c, µ > is a model of DF (C).
PROPOSITION 2.1. Let B 6= φ, µ : C → B and R1, R2 ⊆ B × B. Then
< B,R1, R2, µ > is a model of DF (C) iff:
1. R1 is reflexive and transitive (i.e. R1 is a pre-ordering on B),
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2. R2 is symmetric,
3. R1 ⊆ R2,
4. R2|R1 ⊆ R2, where R2|R1 is the relative product of R2 and R1.
Proof. < B,R1, R
c
2, R2, R
c
1, µ > satisfies axioms 1-6 iff conditions 1-3 above
are satisfied.
Axiom 7 is equivalent to ∀x∀z[∃y(Axy∧Eyz) → Exz]. So axiom 7 is satis-
fied iff R1|R
c
2 ⊆ R
c
2 which, in the presence of condition 2, is equivalent to con-
dition 4. 
2.4. Models ofNF (C). The structures in which NF (C) may be in-
terpreted (henceforth NF (C)-structures) are exactly the DF (C)-structures.
For Γ∪{σ} ⊆ BN(C) we write Γ B σ to mean that B  σ whenever B  Γ,
where B is an NF (C)-structure and B  σ, B  Γ are defined as usual.
Two NF (C)-structures B, B′ are said to be BN(C)-equivalent, basically
equivalent, or (for short) B-eq if for every σ ∈ BN(C), B  σ iff B′  σ; in
this case we may say also that B is B-eq to B′. This notion may be extended
in an obvious way to the other formalization of AAS.
DEFINITION 2.2. An NF (C)-structure B is said to be a direct model (or,
for short, a d-model) if for every Γ∪{σ} ⊆ BN(C), Γ B σ whenever Γ
d
⊢ σ.
The proof of the following is straightforward.
PROPOSITION 2.3. An NF (C)-structure < B,A∗, E∗, I∗, O∗, µ > is a d-
model iff all of the rules of inference of NF (C) are valid in it (in the sense
that if the antecedents are true in it, then so also is the consequent), iff:
1. A∗µ is reflexive on µ(C) and transitive (equivalently, A∗µ is a pre-
ordering on µ(C)),
2. A∗µ ⊆
`
I∗µ,
3. E∗µ is symmetric,
4. A∗µ|E∗µ ⊆ E∗µ,
where, for a set X, Xµ = X∩(µ(C)×µ(C)); and for a binary relation R,
`
R is
its converse. 
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DEFINITION 2.4. The canonical structureBΓ corresponding to Γ(⊆ BN(C))
is the NF (C)-structure < B,A∗, E∗, I∗, O∗, µ > satisfying:
1. B = C,
2. µ = lC , where for a set X, lX is the identity function on X,
3. for every Y ∈ {A,E, I, O}, Y ∗ = {< a, b >∈ C × C : Y ab ∈ Γ}.
An NF (C)-structure is said to be canonical if it is equal to BΓ, for some
Γ ⊆ BN(C).
The basic property of BΓ is:
BΓ  σ iff σ ∈ Γ all σ ∈ BN(C).
Every NF (C)-structure B =< B,A∗, E∗, I∗, O∗, µ > in which µ = lC is
an extension of a canonical structure; namely the canonical structure corre-
sponding to {σ ∈ BN(C) : B  σ}.
LEMMA 2.5. For Γ ⊆ BN(C), BΓd is a d-model (of Γ
d hence of Γ).
Proof. Let ∆∪{σ} ⊆ BN(C) and let ∆
d
⊢ σ. If BΓd  ∆ then ∆ ⊆ Γ
d, hence
σ ∈ Γd, consequentlyBΓd  σ. 
THEOREM 2.6. (Direct soundness and completeness). Direct deduction is
sound and complete with respect to the class of all direct models. That is,
for every Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C),
Γ
d
⊢ σ iff Γ
d
 σ
where “Γ
d
 σ” means that Γ 
B
σ for every d-model B.
Proof. Soundness is immediate by the definition. To prove completeness as-
sume Γ
d
 σ then, in particular, Γ B
Γd
σ. But BΓd  Γ, thenBΓd  σ, conse-
quently σ ∈ Γd, hence Γ
d
⊢ σ. 
DEFINITION 2.7. (General models). An NF (C)-structure B is said to be
a general model (or, for short, a g-model) if for every Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C),
Γ 
B
σ whenever Γ
g
⊢ σ.
LEMMA 2.8. For Γ ⊆ BN(C), BΓg is a g-model (of Γ
g hence of Γ).
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Proof. Replace “d” by “g” in the proof of lemma 2.5. 
THEOREM 2.9. (General soundness and completeness). General deduction
is sound and complete with respect to the class of all general models. That
is, for every Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C),
Γ
g
⊢ σ iff Γ
g
 σ
where “Γ
g
 σ” means that Γ 
B
σ for every g-model B.
Proof. Replace “d” by “g” in the proof of lemma 2.6. 
THEOREM 2.10. (NF (C)-compactness). For every e ∈ {d, g}, for every
Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C),
Γ
e
 σ iff for some finite Γ1 ⊆ Γ, Γ1
e
 σ.
Proof. By e-soundness and e-completeness. 
In theorem 9.4 below the g-models will be fully characterized. Now we
confine ourselves to the following:
REMARKS and definitions 2.11.
1. Every g-model is a d-model (obvious) but not vice versa. For, let
Γ = {Eaa} for some a ∈ C, then BΓd is a d-model but not a g-model.
2. Every model of DF (C) is obviously a g-model (hence a d-model) but
not vice versa. For let Γ = {Oaa} for some a ∈ C, then BΓg is a g-model
but not a model of DF (C).
3. For every g-modelB =< B,A∗, E∗, I∗, O∗, µ > in which µ is surjective,
A∗ = E∗ = I∗ = O∗ = B × B iff (A∗ ∩ O∗ 6= φ or E∗ ∩ I∗ 6= φ) iff for some
σ ∈ BN(C), B  σ, σ̂. Such models are called full models.
If A∗ ∪ O∗ = B × B = E∗ ∪ I∗(respectively A∗ ∩ O∗ = φ = E∗ ∩ I∗), B
is said to be complete (respectively consistent). Thus B is not full iff it is
consistent. Bφg is an example of a g-model in which µ is bijective, while it
is not complete.
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These notions may be generalized to all NF (C)-structures, µ does not
have to be surjective.
4. Let B =< B,A∗, E∗, I∗, O∗, µ > be an NF (C)-structure in which µ
is surjective. Then B is not complete iff for some σ ∈ BN(C), (B 2 σ and
B 2 σ̂) iff for some σ ∈ BN(C), B 2 σ and for all ρ ∈ BN(C), {σ̂} B ρ, ρ̂.
5. For Γ ⊆ BN(C), Γ is consistent iff it has a consistent d-model.
6. Direct deduction is sound with respect to any class of models with
respect to which general deduction is sound.
2.5. Order models and Venn models. To the best of my knowledge
Shepherdson (1956) was the first to make use of a version of order models;
the ordering was pre-ordering (reflexive and transitive, but not necessarily
antisymmetric) and the context was the semantics of a version of DF (C).
In the context of the semantics of NF (C), or versions thereof, versions of
order models were made use of in Martin (1997) and in Glashoff (2002). The
former required a model to be some variation on a lower semi-lattice with a
smallest element, the latter relaxed these conditions; none of them mentioned
that Shepherdson (1956) made use of order models.
Following Shepherdson (1956), let R1 be a pre-ordering on a non-empty
set B; and following Glashoff (2002), put:
R2 = {< x, y >∈ B × B : {x, y} has an R1-lower bound}.
Let µ be a function from C to B, then < B,R1, R2, µ > is a model of
DF (C), hence a g-model and a d-model. Such models are said to be order
models. If R1 is a partial ordering (equivalently, antisymmetric) the order
model will also be called partial (or antisymmetric). < B,R1 > is said to
be the order structure underlying the order model < B,R1, R2, µ >. Notice
that if < B,R1, R
′
2, µ > is a model of DF (C), then R2 ⊆ R
′
2.
A concrete order model (henceforth c.o.m, and c.o.ms for the plural) is an
order model in which B is a collection of non-empty sets and R1 is ⊆, so the
c.o.ms are partial. If R′ is defined on such a B by xR′y iff , x ∩ y 6= φ then
for every µ : C → B,< B,⊆, R′, µ > is a model of DF (C). Such models are
said to be Venn models.
In an order model B =< B,R1, R2, µ >, R2 is determined by B and R1,
so we may write -for short- “B =< B,R1, µ >”. For similar reasons we may
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write “< B, µ >” to denote the Venn model < B,⊆, R′, µ >; the c.o.m with
the same B and µ is denoted by “< B,⊆, µ >”.
Let B = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, then for every µ : C → B,< B,⊆, µ > is a c.o.m
but not a Venn model and < B, µ > is a Venn model but not a c.o.m. This
is not always the case, for if the universe is the set of all non-empty subsets
of a non-empty set, then the model is both a Venn model and a c.o.m. Every
Venn model is embeddable in such a model which is B-eq to it. A Venn
model with universe B is a c.o.m iff for every b, b′ ∈ B there is c ∈ B such
that c ⊆ b ∩ b′ whenever b ∩ b′ 6= φ.
Let C,C′ ∈{the class of all Venn models, the class of all c.o.ms, the class of
all partial order models, the class of all order models}, then for every B ∈ C
there isB′ ∈ C′ which is B-eq to it, hence C = C′ (with the usual meaning).
This is a corollary of the above discussion and the following observation.
Let B =< B,R1, R2, µ > be an order model. Define the function
′ from
B to ℘(B) by b′ = R1 [b], where for a binary relation ρ, ρ[y] = {x ∈ Domain
ρ : xρy}. Let B′ be the range of ′ and define the function µ′ from C to B′
by µ′(c) = µ(c)′. Then B′ =< B′,⊆, µ′ > is a c.o.m which is a Venn model
and ′ is a homomorphism from B onto B′. It is an isomorphism iff R1 is
antisymmetric. In all cases B and B′ are B-eq.
2.6. Models and interpretations.
2.6.1. MF (P) and SF (J). Let f be an interpretation of BM(P) in
BS(J) and let B be a model of SF (J). Put:
µ : P→ ℘(J)− {φ}.
µ(Q) = {j ∈ J : B  Ajf(Q)}
then B′ =< J, µ > is a model of MF (P). It is easy to see that:
1. For every positive universal α ∈ BM(P), B′  α iff B  αf .
2. For every positive particular α ∈ BM(P), B′  α only if B  αf . The
other direction holds iff for every i, j ∈ Range f there is k ∈ J such that
both B  Aki and B  Akj whenever B  Iij. In this case:
B
′
 α iff B  αf for every α ∈ BM(P).
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On the other hand, let h be an interpretation of BS(J) in BM(P) and
let B be a model of MF (P). Put:
B
′ : BS(J)→ 2
B
′(α) = 1 iff B  αh,
then B′ is a model of SF (J).
2.6.2. SF (J) andDF (C). Let f be an interpretation of BS(J) in BD(C)
and let B be a model of DF (C). Put:
B
′ : BS(J)→ 2
B
′(α) = 1 iff B  αf ,
then B′ is a model of SF (J).
On the other hand, let h be an interpretation of BD(C) in BS(J) and
let B be a model of SF (J). Define:
R1 = {< i, j >∈ J × J : B(Aij) = 1},
R2 = {< i, j >∈ J × J : B(Iij) = 1},
then B′ =< J,R1, R2, h > is a model of DF (C) and for every α ∈ BD(C)
B
′
 α iff B  αh.
2.6.3. DF (C) and MF (P). Let f be an interpretation of BD(C) in
BM(P) and let B =< B, µ > be a model of MF (P), then B′ =< ℘(B) −
{φ}, µ ◦ f > is a Venn model of DF (C) and for every α ∈ BD(C), B′  α
iff B  αf .
On the other hand, let h be an interpretation of BM(P) in BD(C) and
let B =< B,R1, R2, µ > be a model of DF (C). Put:
µ′ : P→ ℘(B)− {φ}
µ′(Q) = R1 [µh(Q)],
then B′ =< B, µ′ > is a model of MF (P). It is easy to see that:
19
1. For every positive universal α ∈ BM(P), B′  α iff B  αh.
2. For every positive particular α ∈ BM(P), B′  α only if B  αh. The
other direction holds if B is an order model, in this case:
B
′
 α iff B  αh for every α ∈ BM(P).
2.7. Leibniz models. Let η be the partial ordering defined on the set
N of natural numbers by mηn iff m is a multiple of n, and define the partial
ordering R on N × N by < m1, n1 > R < m2, n2 > iff m1ηm2 and n1ηn2.
Denote the binary operations of the greatest common divisor and the least
common multiple on N by
◦
∧ and
◦
∨ respectively, and put:
B = {< m, n >∈ N× N : m
◦
∧ n = 1}.
The restriction of R on B, to be also denoted by “R”, partially orders
B. So, for every µ : C → B, < B,R, µ > is an order model of DF (C),
hence a g-model and a d-model. Such models are called Leibniz models, for
they were first introduced -in a different setting- by him in 1679, as may
be learned from Łukasiewicz (1998, pp. 126-9), Kneale and Kneale (1966,
pp. 337-8) and Glashoff (2002). Leibniz practically defines A∗ to be R, but
he sets I∗ < m1, n1 > < m2, n2 > iff m1
◦
∧ n2 = 1 = n1
◦
∧ m2. To show
that this gives rise to an order model as defined in 2.5 above, notice that
{< m1, n1 >,< m2, n2 >} has an R-lower bound iff there is < m3, n3 >∈ B
such that < m3, n3 > R< m1, n1 > and < m3, n3 > R < m2, n2 >, which
is equivalent to m3η(m1
◦
∨ m2) and n3η(n1
◦
∨ n2). But m3
◦
∧ n3 = 1, so the
condition is equivalent to (m1
◦
∨ m2)
◦
∧ (n1
◦
∨ n2) = 1. The l.h.s. = (m1
◦
∧
n1)
◦
∨ (m1
◦
∧ n2)
◦
∨ (m2
◦
∧ n1)
◦
∨ (m2
◦
∧ n2). But m1
◦
∧ n1 = 1 = m2
◦
∧ n2,
so the condition is equivalent to (m1
◦
∧ n2)
◦
∨ (m2
◦
∧ n1) = 1 which is
equivalent to Leibniz condition. Via reductio ad absurdum Glashoff (2002)
gave a different proof of the same result.
Every Leibniz model is isomorphic to a Venn model. The converse is not
true, for B is denumerable while there are non-denumerable Venn models.
2.7.1. Assigning Leibniz models. For Γ ⊆ BN(C) put:
20
CΓ = {c ∈ C : c occurs in some element of Γ having two distinct categor-
ical constants}.
Γ will be called essentially finite if CΓ is finite. This notion may be gen-
eralized to subsets of BM(P) and BS(J).
LEMMA 2.12. CΓd = CΓ.
Proof. By proposition 1.11 and induction on the length of the deduction. 
THEOREM 2.13. To each consistent essentially finite Γ ⊆ BN(C) a Leibniz
model of Γ may be assigned (cf. Glashoff 2010, Lemma 3.4).
Proof. Let < B,R > be the order structure underlying the Leibniz models.
Put ℓ = |CΓ| and let < ci >i∈ℓ be an injective enumeration of CΓ, < pi >i∈ℓ
be an injective ℓ-sequence of primes and b ∈ B. Define µ : C → B as follows:
µ(c) = b if c ∈ C − CΓ,
and for i ∈ ℓ, µ(ci) =< mi, ni > where
mi =
∏
j ∈ ℓ
Acicj ∈ Γ
d
pj , ni =
∏
j ∈ ℓ
Ecicj ∈ Γ
d
pj;
mi and ni are square free finite products (the empty product is equal to 1).
By the consistency of Γ, mi
◦
∧ ni = 1 for all i ∈ ℓ. Therefore B =< B,R, µ >
is a Leibniz model.
To show that B  Γ:
1. Let i, k ∈ ℓ, then Acick ∈ Γ
d only if (∀j ∈ ℓ)[(Ackcj ∈ Γ
d → Acicj ∈
Γd) ∧ (Eckcj ∈ Γ
d → Ecicj ∈ Γ
d)] only if < mi, ni > R < mk, nk > only if
miηpk only if Acick ∈ Γ
d. So Acick ∈ Γ
d iff B  Acick. Consequently, for
every c, c′ ∈ C, B  Acc′ if Acc′ ∈ Γ.
Moreover if for some c, c′ ∈ C, Occ′ ∈ Γ, then by the consistency of Γ
there are i, k ∈ ℓ such that i 6= k and c = ci, c
′ = ck.
Again by the consistency of Γ, Acick /∈ Γ
d, henceB 2 Acick, consequently
B  Ocick.
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2. Let i, k ∈ ℓ be such that i 6= k, then Ecick ∈ Γ
d only if niηpk only
if ni
◦
∧ mk 6= 1 only if B 2 Icick only if ∃j ∈ ℓ[Acicj, Eckcj ∈ Γ
d ∨ Ackcj ,
Ecicj ∈ Γ
d] only if Ecick ∈ Γ
d. From this and the consistency of Γ it follows
that for every c, c′ ∈ C, B  Ecc′, B  Icc′ whenever Ecc′ ∈ Γ, Icc′ ∈ Γ re-
spectively. 
2.7.2. Leibniz soundness and completeness. For e ∈ {d, g}, e-deduction is
sound with respect to the set of all Leibniz models (to be denoted, henceforth,
by “L”) as they are order models. Regarding completeness, for Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆
BN(C) put:
Γ L σ iff Γ B σ for every B ∈ L.
THEOREM 2.14. If Γ is essentially finite, then Γ
g
⊢ σ whenever Γ 
L
σ.
Proof. Obvious if Γ is inconsistent. Let Γ be consistent and Γ 
L
σ, then by
theorem 2.13 Γ∪{σ̂} is inconsistent, from which the result follows. 
REMARKS 2.15.
1. From Łukasiewicz (1998, pp. 126-9) it follows that:
SF (J) ⊢ α iff L′ α
where α is any sentence (not necessarily basic) of the language J , and L′ is
the obvious adaptation of L to J . Consequently, for every Γ∪{α} ⊆ BS(J):
SF (J) ∪ Γ ⊢ α only if Γ L′ α,
the other direction holds if Γ is essentially finite.
2. In the above remark, as well as in theorem 2.14, only square free Leib-
niz models (with the obvious definition) may be taken into consideration.
2.7.3. Generalization. Theorem 2.13 cannot be unconditionally general-
ized to infinite CΓ. For, let < ci >i∈N be an injective enumeration of some
denumerable subset of C. Put:
Γ = {Acici+1 : i ∈ N} ∪ {Oci+1ci : i ∈ N}
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then Γ is consistent but has no Leibniz model, though it has a Venn model.
The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for Γ to have a Leibniz
model if CΓ is denumerable.
THEOREM 2.16. Let CΓ be denumerable and let < ci >i∈N be an injective
enumeration of it. Then Γ has a Leibniz model if it is consistent and for
every i ∈ N, {q ∈ N : Acicq ∈ Γ
d} is finite.
Proof. Along the lines of the proof of theorem 2.13 with the following modi-
fications. Let < pi >i∈N be an injective enumeration of the primes, put:
mi =
∏
Acicj∈Γd
pj , ni =
∏
Ecicj ∈ Γ
d
j < max{q ∈ N : Acicq ∈ Γ
d}
pj. 
To see that the condition of the above theorem is essentially necessary,
define the equivalence relation ∼Γ on CΓ by a ∼Γ b iff Aab, Aba ∈ Γ
d (cf.
section 1.5 above).
THEOREM 2.17. If Γ has a Leibniz model then there is a consistent exten-
sion Γ′ of Γ such that CΓ′ = CΓ, CΓ′/ ∼Γ′ is countable and for every a ∈ CΓ′ ,
with at most two exceptions, Qa(= {c ∈ CΓ′ : Aac ∈ Γ
′d}/ ∼Γ′) is finite.
Proof. Let B(=< B,R, µ >) be a Leibniz model of Γ. Put:
Γ′ = Γ ∪ {σ ∈ BN(CΓ) : B  σ},
then CΓ′ = CΓ and CΓ′/ ∼Γ′ is countable.
If for some a ∈ CΓ′, Qa is infinite, then µ(a) ∈ {< 0, 1 >,< 1, 0 >} from
which the last part of the theorem follows. 
REMARKS 2.18.
1. In the underlying order structure of a Leibniz model B =< B,R, µ >,
< 1, 1 > is the greatest element and < 0, 1 >,< 1, 0 > are the only minimal
elements. Let a, c ∈ C. If µ(a) =< 1, 1 > then B  Aca. Also assuming that
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µ(a) ∈ {< 0, 1 >,< 1, 0 >}, then B  Aca implies that µ(c) = µ(a) hence
B  Aac, and B  Ica implies that B  Aac.
2. There would be no exceptions in the above theorem had N been re-
placed by N+ in the definition of Leibniz models, which is equivalent to
excluding < 0, 1 > and < 1, 0 > from the universe of Leibniz models.
3. Noticing that c ∼Γ c
′ forces c, c′ to be assigned the same value in any
Leibniz model of Γ, with a slight modification of its proof, theorem 2.16 may
be strengthened as follows:
Γ has a Leibniz model if there is a consistent extension Γ′ of Γ such that:
1. CΓ′ = CΓ.
2. CΓ′/ ∼Γ′ is countable.
3. For every a ∈ CΓ, {c/ ∼Γ: Aac ∈ Γ
′d} is finite.
4. The above strengthening is very close to be the converse of theorem
2.17. As a matter of fact, it is its converse had N been replaced by N+ in the
definition of Leibniz models.
5. The completeness theorem 2.14 may be generalized in line with the
above generalizations.
2.7.4. Logico-philosophical discussion of Leibniz models. “It is strange
that his [Leibniz’s] philosophic intuitions, which guided him in his research,
yielded such a sound result.” says Łukasiewicz (1998, p. 126). Hopefully the
above reasoning would make matters less strange.
Following is a further discussion taking into consideration the Liebnizian
correlation between prime and composite numbers on one hand and atomic
and composite sentences, propositions, concepts or attributes on the other
hand (cf. Glashoff 2002, 2010).
If the primes p1, p2 correspond, respectively, to the atomic sentences p
′
1, p
′
2,
it is natural to let the composite number p1p2 correspond to the composite
sentence p′1 ∧ p
′
2 . The difficulty here is that p
2
1, which is not equal to a
prime, would correspond to the sentence p′1 ∧ p
′
1, which is equivalent to an
atomic sentence; as conjunction of sentences is idempotent, while multiplica-
tion of numbers is not. Obviously this difficulty will not arise for square free
numbers.
Notice that in the definitions of µ : C → B given above, the values
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assigned by µ to the elements of CΓ are always ordered pairs of square free
numbers. Extending this property to all elements of C, after relaxing it to
permit < 0, 1 >,< 1, 0 > also to be taken as values, gives rise to what will
be called essentially square free Leibniz models.
To investigate the relationship between the Leibniz models and the es-
sentially square free Leibniz models, let < qij >i,j∈N be an injective double
sequence of primes. Map the kth power of the ith prime pi on
∏
j∈k
qij . This
mapping may be extended in the obvious way to an injection ν from N to
N such that ν(0) = 0 and for n ≥ 1, ν(n) is square free (being the empty
product of primes, ν(1) = 1). The mapping ν may be further extended, in
the obvious way, to N× N, the extension also will be denoted by “ν”. It
may be easily seen that ν(B) ⊆ B and that < m1, n1 > R < m2, n2 > iff
ν(< m1, n1 >)Rν(< m2, n2 >) for every < m1, n1 >,< m2, n2 >∈ B. So for
every Leibniz model B(=< B,R, µ >), ν is a monomorphism from B into
B
ν(=< B,R, νµ >) which is essentially square free and is basically equivalent
to B. Moreover if in Bν , B is replaced by ν(B) and R by R∩ (ν(B)×ν(B)),
then ν will be an isomorphism. Such models will be called proper Leibniz
models. Since every Leibniz model is isomorphic to a proper Leibniz model,
attention may be confined to the latter.
Let < q′ij >i,j∈N be an injective double sequence of atomic sentences in
some sentential language. For < m, n >∈ ν(B) put:
λ(< m, n >) =
∧
mηqij
q′ij ∧
∧
nηqij
qq′ij.
As 1ηp for no prime p,
∧
1ηqij
q′ij =
∧
1ηqij
qq′ij = the empty conjunction, which
is always true. So λ(< 1, 1 >) is always true.
On the other hand, 0ηp for every prime p, so
λ(< 0, 1 >) =
∧
i,j∈N
q′ij and λ(< 1, 0 >) =
∧
i,j∈N
qq′ij.
These are the only infinitary sentences to be considered.
It may be easily seen that for every proper Leibniz modelB, B  Ac1c2 iff
λµc1 → λµc2 is a tautology, and B  Ec1c2 iff λµc1∧λµc2 is a contradiction.
As a matter of fact < 0, 1 >,< 1, 0 > and < 1, 1 > are not indispensable
as elements of the universe of proper Leibniz models. To keep them or not
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is a philosophical choice. Rejecting them is probably more compatible with
the Aristotelian legacy.
Following Boole (1948, p. 49), to each < m, n >∈ ν(B) the set θ(<
m, n >) of all truth assignments which satisfy λ(< m, n >) may be appro-
priated. For every proper Leibniz model (hence for every Leibniz model) B,
θ induces an isomorphism of B onto a Venn model which is a concrete order
model.
3. Decidability.
REMARKS 3.1. Let a, b, c ∈ C and Γ ⊆ BN(C).
1. If {Ecc, Occ} ∩ Γ 6= φ, Γ may be easily seen to be contradictory. In
such a case Γ is said to be plainly contradictory.
2. Γ
d
⊢ Oab iff Oab ∈ Γ.
3. If Γ
d
⊢ Ecc then Ecc ∈ Γ or c ∈ CΓ.
4. If Γ is not plainly contradictory, then Γ is contradictory iff there are
σ, σ̂ ∈ (Γd ∩ BN(CΓ)).
5. Γd ∩BN(CΓ) = (Γ ∩ BN(CΓ))
d ∩BN(CΓ).
6. In a different context, Glashoff (2005) presents an algorithm which
may be regarded as a prelude to the one given below. Roughly speaking, it
amounts -in our terminology- to: For a finite Γ(⊆ BN(C)), Γd ∩ BN(CΓ)
may be obtained from Γ in finitely many steps.
THEOREM 3.2. There is a polynomial (of degree 8) time algorithm to de-
cide for any essentially finite Γ(⊆ BN(C)) which is not plainly contradictory
whether it is contradictory, and to assign a Leibniz model to it if it is not.
Proof. Let Γ satisfy the conditions of the theorem, then BN(CΓ) is finite.
Put Γ′ = Γ ∩ BN(CΓ) and ∆ = Γ
′d ∩BN(CΓ).
The input of the algorithm is Γ′ structured as a list < γi >i∈n where
n = |Γ′|, and for every i ∈ n, γi =< γij >j∈3 where γio ∈ {A,E, I, O} and
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γi1, γi2 ∈ CΓ. CΓ may be obtained from Γ
′ or supplied as a secondary input.
|CΓ| ≤ 2n and |BN(CΓ)| ≤ 16n
2.
The next step is to extract for each Y ∈ {A,E, I, O}, Γ′Y (the set of all
elements of Γ′ starting with Y ) which may be done through a simple scanning
procedure in a linear time. Then construct ∆Y (with the obvious meaning)
for each Y ∈ {A,E, I, O}.
Notice that ∆O = Γ
′
O and ∆A is needed to construct each of ∆E and
∆I . To construct ∆A start with the list Γ
′
A. At most 16n
4 comparisons are
needed to determine all the possible applicabilities of Barbara. And for each
possible applicability at most 4n2 comparisons are needed to check whether
the consequent is already there. If not, append it.
It is needed to repeat this process at most 4n2 times to cover all the
required applications of Barbara. In addition, for each c ∈ CΓ at most 4n
2
comparisons are needed to check whether Acc is listed; if not, append it. It
is easy to see that this completes the construction of ∆A.
By simple variations on the above procedure ∆E may be constructed.
Constructing ∆I is much simpler.
Γ is contradictory iff σ, σ̂ ∈ ∆ for some σ, which needs at most 32n4
comparisons to check.
If Γ is consistent assign to it a Leibniz model along the lines of the proof of
theorem 2.13 (in the appendix a polynomial (in n of degree 6) time algorithm
will be presented to generate the first n primes).
The total running time is bounded above by a polynomial (in n) of degree
8. 
4. Basic equivalence of the four formalizations. Let Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆
BN(C), let h and H be bijective interpretations of BN(C) in BS(J) and
BM(P) respectively, and let < Γ′, σ′, T >∈ {< Γ, σ,DF (C) >, < Γh, σh,
SF (J) >, < ΓH , σH ,MF (P) >}.
THEOREM 4.1.
1. Γ is consistent iff Γ′ ∪ T is.
2. Γ ⊢g σ iff Γ′ ∪ T ⊢ σ′.
Proof. From proposition 1.13, if of (1) and only if of (2) follow.
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The other two directions for < Γ′, σ′, T >=< Γh, σh, SF (J) > follow
from the corresponding directions for < Γ′, σ′, T >=< Γ, σ,DF (C) >, this
is a consequence of proposition 1.14. So it remains to prove these two other
directions for < Γ′, σ′, T >∈ {< Γ, σ,DF (C) >, < ΓH , σH ,MF (P) >}.
Only if of (1): Assume Γ is consistent. Let ∆ be a finite subset of Γ, then
by theorem 2.13 it has a Leibniz model, B say. B is a model of ∆∪DF (C);
from this the consistency of Γ ∪ DF (C) follows. Since ∆ may be assumed
to be the inverse image of some finite ∆′ ⊆ ΓH , then by subsection 2.6.3, B
induces a model of ∆′ ∪MF (P). From this the consistency of ΓH ∪MF (P)
follows.
If of (2): Let Γ′ ∪ T ⊢ σ′, then Γ′ ∪ {σ̂′} ∪ T is inconsistent. By part (1),
Γ∪{σ̂} is inconsistent, hence Γ ⊢g σ. 
REMARKS 4.2.
1. As far as the basic sentences are concerned, the four formalizations are
equivalent in the sense expressed by part 2 of the above theorem; so it may
be said, for brevity, that they are basically equivalent.
2. In the above theorem, the only if direction of (1) and the if direction
of (2) may be directly proved for < Γ′, σ′, T >=< Γh, σh, SF (J) >.
5. Venn soundness and completeness. Let Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C).
DEFINITION 5.1. Γ 
V
σ iff Γ 
B
σ for every Venn model B.
THEOREM 5.2. (Venn soundness and completeness). General deduction is
sound and complete with respect to the class of Venn models. That is Γ
g
⊢ σ
iff Γ 
V
σ.
Proof. Every Venn model is a DF (C) model (subsection 2.5), then a g-model
(2 of remarks 2.11). This guarantees soundness.
To prove completeness, let Γ
g
0 σ, then Γ∪{σ̂} is consistent then, by the-
orem 4.1, (Γ∪ {σ̂})H ∪MF (P) is consistent where H is a bijective interpre-
tation of BN(C) in BM(P), for some appropriate P. By well known results
in first order logic, (Γ ∪ {σ̂})H ∪MF (P) has a model. By subsection 2.6.3
and 2 of remarks 2.11, Γ∪{σ̂} has a Venn model, hence Γ 2
V
σ. 
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Alternatively theorem 6.3 below may be made use of to directly show
that Γ ∪ {σ̂} has a Venn model.
REMARKS 5.3.
1. In view of subsection 2.5, the above theorem entails that general de-
duction is sound and complete with respect to each of the classes of order,
partial order, and concrete order models.
2. Direct ways to Venn models on one hand, and to order and partial
order models on the other hand, will be presented in sections 6 and 9 respec-
tively.
3. For the Venn soundness and completeness of Łukasiewicz’s system,
Shepherdson (1956) may be consulted.
6. Direct way to Venn models. Let Γ ⊆ BN(C), put D = {< a, b >∈
C × C : {Iab, Iba} ∩ Γd 6= φ}, B = ℘(D)− {φ}. Define the function µ from
C to B by:
µ(c) = {< a, b >∈ D : {Aac, Abc} ∩ Γd 6= φ}.
Then < B, µ > is a Venn model (which is a concrete order model), denote it
by “BΓ”.
LEMMA 6.1. For every c, c′ ∈ C, the following are equivalent:
1. Acc′ ∈ Γd,
2. µ(c) ⊆ µ(c′) (which is equivalent to BΓ  Acc′),
3. < c, c >∈ µ(c′).
Proof. Straightforward. 
LEMMA 6.2. Let c, c′ ∈ C, consider:
1. < c, c′ >∈ D,
2. < c, c′ >∈ µ(c) ∩ µ(c′),
3. µ(c) ∩ µ(c′) 6= φ (which is equivalent to BΓ  Icc′, Ic′c),
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4. {Ecc′, Ec′c} ∩ Γd = φ,
then 1 is equivalent to 2 which implies 3 which, for consistent Γ, implies 4.
Proof. The first two parts are easy to see. For the last part assume µ(c) ∩
µ(c′) 6= φ 6= {Ecc′, Ec′c} ∩ Γd, then Ecc′ ∈ Γd and there are a, b ∈ C such
that (Iab ∈ Γd or Iba ∈ Γd), (Aac ∈ Γd or Abc ∈ Γd) and (Aac′ ∈ Γd
or Abc′ ∈ Γd). So there are eight cases to consider. We deal only with
the case Iab, Aac, Abc′ ∈ Γd; the other cases are similar or easier. In this
case Aac, Ecc′ ∈ Γd, then Eac′ ∈ Γd, then Ec′a ∈ Γd, but Abc′ ∈ Γd, then
Eba ∈ Γd, then Eab ∈ Γd which contradicts that Iab ∈ Γd; from this and the
consistency of Γ the result follows. 
THEOREM 6.3. (Existence of Venn models). Let Γ ⊆ BN(C) be consistent,
then BΓ is a Venn model (which is a concrete order model) of Γ.
Proof. Let c, c′ ∈ C. By lemma 6.1, Acc′ ∈ Γd iff BΓ  Acc′. From this it
follows that for Y ∈ {A,O}, BΓ  Y cc′ if Y cc′ ∈ Γd.
Moreover, if Icc′ ∈ Γd then < c, c′ >∈ D then, by lemma 6.2, BΓ  Icc′.
Finally, if Ecc′ ∈ Γd then, by lemma 6.2, µ(c) ∩ µ(c′) = φ then BΓ  Ecc′.
Lemma 6.1 syntactically characterizes {Acc′ ∈ BN(C) : BΓ  Acc′},
hence it syntactically characterizes {Occ′ ∈ BN(C) : BΓ  Occ′}. The
following syntactical characterization of {Icc′ ∈ BN(C) : BΓ  Icc′}, hence
of {Ecc′ ∈ BN(C) : BΓ  Ecc′},
B
Γ
 Icc′ iff Γ
d′
⊢ Icc′
is an immediate consequence of lemma 8.3 below; the definition of “
d′
⊢” may
be found at the beginning of section 8 below.
Slightly modifying the above construction, light may be shed on the role
played by the Venn models among the models of DF (C).
THEOREM 6.4. For every DF (C) model B =< B,R1, R2, µ > there is a
Venn model B′ =< B′, µ′ > and surjection h : B → B′ such that:
1. µ′ = hµ and for every b1, b2 ∈ B:
b1R1b2 iff h(b1) ⊆ h(b2) , b1R2b2 iff h(b1) ∩ h(b2) 6= φ,
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2. B and B′ are basically equivalent,
3. h is an isomorphism iff R1 is antisymmetric.
Proof. Put:
h : B → ℘(℘(B))
h(b) = {{b1, b2} ∈ ℘(B) : (b1R2b2 or b2R2b1)
and (b1R1b or b2R1b)},
B′ = h(B) , µ′ = hµ.
The rest of the proof is easy. 
7. Variations on NF (C). As was promised in section 1, we follow
in subsection 7.1 the long standing tradition of not permitting the subject
and the predicate of a categorical sentence to be the same. The resulting
formalization, WF (C), and its relationship to NF (C) are discussed.
In subsection 7.2 the standpoint that Acc′ requires that all c are c′ but
not vice versa, will be considered.
7.1. Weak natural deduction formalization of AAS. The alphabet
of the logical system WF (C), the weak natural deduction formalization of
AAS, is the same as the alphabet of NF (C). The set W (C) of sentences of
WF (C) is defined as follows:
W (C) = S(C)− {Y cc : Y ∈ {A,E, I, O} and c ∈ C}.
In accordance with subsection 1.6, the set BW (C) of basic sentences of
WF (C) is W (C) itself.
The rules of inference of WF (C) are those of NF (C) after dropping the
first one (
Aaa
). The weak direct and general deduction relations are respec-
tively denoted by “
wd
⊢ ” and “
wg
⊢ ” and are defined along the lines of definitions
1.8 and 1.9 respectively. The definition of the other notions introduced in
the theory of NF (C) may be modified in the obvious way to render the
corresponding definitions for the theory of WF (C).
The theory of WF (C) may be obtained from that of NF (C) by making
the obvious modifications. The key observations are the following, where
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Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BW (C).
PROPOSITION 7.1.
Γ
wd
⊢ σ iff Γ
d
⊢ σ.
Proof. The only if direction is obvious. To prove the other direction let
< ρi >i∈n be a d-deduction of σ from Γ. We show by induction that for
every i ∈ n, Γ
wd
⊢ ρi if ρi ∈ BW (C).
Distinguish between four cases:
1. ρi = Occ
′, then ρi ∈ Γ, then Γ
wd
⊢ ρi.
2. ρi = Acc
′, then the result follows by the induction hypothesis.
3. ρi = Icc
′, then Icc′ ∈ Γ or ρj = Ac
′c for some j < i. From this and
part 2 the result follows by the induction hypothesis.
4. σ = Ecc′, then the result follows by the induction hypothesis noting
that if Ecc′ is obtained via applying Acc
′,Ec′c′
Ecc′
then the first occurrence of
Ec′c′ in the deduction must be obtained via Ac
′c′′,Ec′′c′
Ec′c′
for some c′′ 6= c′. By
part 2 and the induction hypothesis Γ
wd
⊢ Acc′, Ac′c′′, Ec′′c′, hence Γ
wd
⊢ Ecc′.
PROPOSITION 7.2.
Γ is wd-consistent iff Γ is d-consistent (hence Γ
wg
⊢ σ iff Γ
g
⊢ σ).
Proof. The if direction easily follows from proposition 7.1. To prove the
other direction assume that Γ is d-inconsistent, then Γ
d
⊢ Y cc′, Ŷ cc′ for some
Y ∈ {A,E, I, O} and some c, c′ ∈ C. If c 6= c′ the result follows by the
previous proposition. Else, distinguish between two cases:
1. Occ ∈ {Y cc, Ŷ cc}, then Occ ∈ Γ which is not permitted.
2. Ecc ∈ {Y cc, Ŷ cc}. In this case there is a d-deduction of Ecc from
Γ. The rule made use of to justify the first occurrence of Ecc in this de-
duction must be Acc
′′,Ec′′c
Ecc
for some c′′ 6= c. By the previous proposition
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Γ
wd
⊢ Ic′′c, Ec′′c, hence Γ is wd-inconsistent. 
COROLLARY 7.3. Γ is wd-consistent iff Γ is d-consistent iff Γ is
g-consistent iff Γ is wg-consistent.
Proof. Γ is wd-consistent only if Γ is d-consistent only if Γ is g-consistent
only if Γ is wg-consistent only if Γ is wd-consistent. 
REMARK 7.4. From propositions 7.1 and 7.2 it follows that the results con-
cerning Leibniz soundness and completeness (subsection 2.7.2) and Venn and
order soundness and completeness (section 5) apply to WF (C) after replac-
ing d, g and BN(C) by wd, wg and BW (C) respectively.
7.2. Proper natural deduction formalization of AAS. AAS may
be interpreted to require Acc′ to hold iff all c are c′ but not vice versa. That
is, extensionally, the denotation of “c” is required to be a proper subclass of
the denotation of “c′”.
To satisfy this requirement introduce the logical system PF (C), the
proper natural deduction formalization of AAS, based on the same language
as the system NF (C). So the set P (C) of sentences of PF (C) is the same as
S(C). In accordance with subsection 1.6 the set BP (C) of basic sentences of
PF (C) is P (C) itself. For “Occ′” to remain to be the contradictory of “Acc′”,
it must be interpreted as some c are not c′ or (all c are c′ and vice versa).
The rules of inference of PF (C) are to be obtained from those of NF (C)
by dropping the first one and augmenting the remaining ones by
Icc
(I-Id)
and
Occ
(O-Id).
The proper direct and general deduction relations are respectively de-
noted by “
pd
⊢” and “
pg
⊢” and are defined along the lines of definitions 1.8 and
1.9 respectively. The definitions of the other notions introduced in the theory
of NF (C) may be modified in the obvious way to render the corresponding
definitions for the theory of PF (C).
PROPOSITION 7.5. For Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BW (C):
1. Γ
pd
⊢ σ iff Γ
wd
⊢ σ (iff Γ
d
⊢ σ).
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2. If Γ is pd-consistent then it is wd-consistent (equivalently d-consistent),
but not always vice versa.
3. If Γ
wg
⊢ σ (equivalently Γ
g
⊢ σ) then Γ
pg
⊢ σ, but not always vice versa.
Proof.
1. The proof of part 1 is similar to that of proposition 7.1.
2. That Γ is wd-consistent if it is pd-consistent easily follows from part
1. To see that the other direction does not always hold consider {Acc′, Ac′c}
for some c, c′ ∈ C such that c 6= c′; this proves part 2.
3. Part 3 is a direct consequence of part 2. 
PROPOSITION 7.6. ∆(⊆ BP (C)) is pd-consistent iff it is pg-consistent.
Proof. Along the lines of the proof of part 4 of proposition 1.11. 
Order models, Leibniz models, and Venn models are not e(∈ {pd, pg})-
models, so it does not make sense to ask whether e is sound or complete
with respect to any of these classes. However, with some modifications, to
be shown below, everything goes as expected.
Let B =< B,A∗, E∗, I∗, O∗, µ > be a d-model of Γ(⊆ BW (C)) such that
µ is injective on CΓ and A
∗µ is antisymmetric, and let Ap, Op be subsets of
B × B such that A∗µ − lµ(C) ⊆ A
pµ ⊆ A∗µ and O∗µ ∪ lµ(C) ⊆ O
pµ. Put:
B
p =< B,Ap, E∗, I∗, Op, µ > .
PROPOSITION 7.7. Bp is a pd-model of Γ.
Proof. Assume B  Γ. To show that Bp  Γ, let γ ∈ Γ then γ = Y cc′ for
some Y ∈ {A,E, I, O} and some c, c′ ∈ C such that c 6= c′, hence µ(c) 6=
µ(c′). If Y = A then < µ(c), µ(c′) >∈ A∗µ− lµ(C) ⊆ A
pµ. The other cases are
obvious.
To show that Bp is a pd-model, assume Bp  Acc′, Ac′c′′. If not Bp 
Acc′′ then µ(c) = µ(c′′), then < µ(c), µ(c′) >,< µ(c′), µ(c) >∈ A∗µ, then
µ(c′) = µ(c) = µ(c′′) which is absurd. So Barbara is valid. The other rules
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are easier to deal with. 
Accordingly, it is legitimate to adopt in the sequel the following modifi-
cations:
Ap = A∗ − lµ(C) , O
p = O∗ ∪ lµ(C).
THEOREM 7.8. Let ∆(⊆ BP (C)) be pd-consistent, then it has a modified
Venn model which is a modified c.o.m and which is also a pg-model. If, in
addition, ∆ is essentially finite then it has also a modified Leibniz model
which is a pg-model.
Proof. Put Γ = ∆∩BW (C), then Γ is pd-consistent, hence it is d-consistent,
hence BΓ is a d-model of Γ in which A∗ is antisymmetric.
To show that µ is injective let c, c′ ∈ C be such that c 6= c′ and µ(c) =
µ(c′), then Γ
d
⊢ Acc′, Ac′c, then Γ
wd
⊢ Acc′, Ac′c, then Γ
pd
⊢ Acc′, Ac′c, then
Γ
pd
⊢ Acc which contradicts that Γ is pd-consistent.
Therefore BΓp is a modified Venn model (which is also a modified c.o.m)
of Γ. By proposition 7.7 it is a pd-model of Γ, from which it may be easily
seen that it is a pg-model of ∆. The proof of the additional result in case ∆ is
essentially finite is almost the same. The only major difference is that µ may
not be injective. But its restriction to C∆ is injective, which is sufficient for
our purpose. 
REMARK 7.9. The last theorem shows that remark 7.4 applies to PF (C)
after making the obvious modifications.
8. Direct completion of direct deduction. In this section the five
rules of inference given in definition 1.7 are augmented by five more rules,
in order that Γg may be directly obtained from Γ in case Γ is consistent (cf.
Glashoff (2005) where related problems are dealt with by brute force via a
computer program). The additional five rules are:
5. Iab
Iba
(Ic) 6. Iab,Abc
Iac
(Darii)
7. Iab,Ebc
Oac
(Ferio) 8. Oab,Acb
Oac
(Baroco)
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9. Aba,Obc
Oac
(Bocardo).
Taking the ten rules of inference into consideration, the d′-deduction re-
lation “
d′
⊢” may be defined along the lines of the definition of “
d
⊢”. Likewise,
all other definitions involving “d” may be modified in an obvious way to give
corresponding definitions involving “d′”.
PROPOSITION 8.1.
1. Γd
′
= {σ ∈ S(C) : Γ
d′
⊢ σ}.
2. CΓd′ = CΓ.
Proof. Along the lines of the proofs of the corresponding results for d: Part
1 of proposition 1.11 and lemma 2.12, respectively. 
The next definition and parts 1,2 of the next lemma are essentially due
to Smith (1983).
DEFINITION 8.2. Let a, b, a′, b′ ∈ C. An a-b chain is a sequence < ci >i∈n∈
nC for some n ∈ N+, such that co = a and cn−1 = b. This chain is said to be
a Γ-chain, or a chain in Γ, if {Acici+1 : i ∈ n − 1} ⊆ Γ; it is said to be an
< a′, b′ > chain if there is i ∈ n− 1 such that ci = a
′ and ci+1 = b
′.
LEMMA 8.3. For a, b ∈ C and Γ ⊆ BN(C):
1. Γ
d
⊢ Aab iff Γ
d′
⊢ Aab iff there is an a-b chain in Γ.
2. Γ
d
⊢ Eab iff Γ
d′
⊢ Eab iff there is Ea′b′ ∈ BN(C) such that
{Ea′b′, Eb′a′} ∩ Γ 6= φ and Γ
d
⊢ Aaa′, Abb′.
3. Γ
d
⊢ Iab iff Iab ∈ Γ or Γ
d
⊢ Aba.
3′. Γ
d′
⊢ Iab iff for some a′, b′ ∈ C, Γ
d′
⊢ Aa′a, Aa′b or
{Ia′b′, Ib′a′} ∩ Γ 6= φ and Γ
d′
⊢ Aa′a, Ab′b.
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4. Γ
d
⊢ Oab iff Oab ∈ Γ.
4′. Γ
d′
⊢ Oab iff for some a′, b′ ∈ C, Γ
d′
⊢ Ia′a, Ea′b or
Oa′b′ ∈ Γ and Γ
d′
⊢ Aa′a, Abb′.
Proof.
1. If is easy to show that the first statement implies the second. By in-
duction it may be shown that the second statement implies the third. Again
by induction it may be shown that the third statement implies the first.
2. It is easy to show that the first statement implies the second and that
the third implies the first. By induction it may be shown that the second
statement implies the third.
Parts 3 and 4 are easy. In each of the parts 3′ and 4′ one direction is easy,
the other may be shown by induction. 
PROPOSITION 8.4. For Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C):
1. If Γ
d
⊢ σ then Γ
d′
⊢ σ.
2. If Γ
d′
⊢ σ then Γ
g
⊢ σ.
3. Γ is g-consistent iff Γ is d′-consistent iff Γ is d-consistent.
(So for e ∈ {d, d′, g} the prefix “e-” may be deleted from “e-consistent”,
“e-inconsistent” and “e-contradictory”).
Proof. Part 1 is obvious, and part 3 is an easy consequence of parts 1 and 2
above and part 4 of proposition 1.11.
Part 2 is immediate if Γ is d-inconsistent. To complete the proof assume
that Γ is d-consistent and proceed by course of values induction. Let Γ ⊢ σ
and let < ρi >i∈n be a d
′-deduction of σ from Γ. If the annotation of ρn−1
(= σ) is that it belongs to Γ or that it is the consequent of a d-rule whose
premises are previous sentences, the result easily follows.
It remains to assume that the annotation of ρn−1 is that it is the conse-
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quent of a new rule. The completion of the proof depends on the specific rule
in use. Following is a proof in the case of Darii. The other cases are similar
or easier.
Let ρn−1 = Iac and let its annotation be that it follows from Iab, Abc
by Darii. By the induction hypothesis Γ
g
⊢ Iab, Abc. By part 3 of propo-
sition 1.11, Γ
d
⊢ Abc, and by the definition of
g
⊢, there is η ∈ BN(C) such
that Γ, Eab
d
⊢ η, η̂. Since Γ is d-consistent then, in view of parts 1 and 4 of
lemma 8.3, there are c′, c′′ ∈ C such that {η, η̂} = {Ic′c′′, Ec′c′′}. By lemma
8.3, Γ
d
⊢ Ic′c′′ and there is Ea′b′ ∈ BN(C) such that {Ea′b′, Eb′a′} ∩ (Γ ∪
{Eab}) 6= φ and Γ ∪ {Eab}
d
⊢ Ac′a′, Ac′′b′, hence Γ
d
⊢ Ac′a′, Ac′′b′. In view
of the d-consistency of Γ, lemma 8.3 implies that Eab ∈ {Ea′b′, Eb′a′}. Let
Eab = Ea′b′ (the other case is similar), then Γ
d
⊢ Ac′a, Ac′′b. But Γ
d
⊢ Abc,
then Γ, Eac
d
⊢ Ec′c′′, hence Γ
g
⊢ Iac. 
In view of the g-deduction completeness with respect to the class of Venn
models, part 2 of the above proposition is an immediate consequence of:
PROPOSITION 8.5. The d′-deduction is sound with respect to the class of
Venn models (hence with respect to the class of order models).
Proof. Routine. 
REMARK 8.6. The converse of part 2 of proposition 8.4 does not always hold.
For if Γ is inconsistent then CΓg = C, while it is easy to find an inconsistent
Γ such that CΓd′ = CΓ 6= C. Also the weaker statement: Γ
d′ ∩ BN(CΓ) =
Γg ∩ BN(CΓ), does not always hold. A counter example is Γ = {Aab,Oab}.
The consistency of Γ solves the problem as the following theorem shows
(cf. Smith 1983).
THEOREM 8.7. For consistent Γ, Γd
′
= Γg.
Proof. The inclusion of Γd
′
in Γg is guaranteed by part 2 of proposition 8.4.
For the other direction assume that Γ is consistent and Γ
g
⊢ σ. If σ is univer-
sal the result follows by part 3 of proposition 1.11 and part 1 of proposition
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8.4. So it remains to deal with the particulars. The consistency of Γ restricts
what to be considered to the following:
Case 1. σ is Iab for some a, b ∈ C. By the method made use of in the
proof of part 2 proposition 8.4, consideration may be restricted to the fol-
lowing subcase only. There are c, c′ ∈ C such that Γ
d
⊢ Icc′, Aca, Ac′b, which
implies that Γ
d′
⊢ Iab.
Case 2. σ is Oab for some a, b ∈ C. In this case Γ, Aab
d
⊢ ρ, ρ̂ for some
ρ ∈ BN(C). Distinguish between two subcases.
Subcase 2.1. For some c, c′ ∈ C, {ρ, ρ̂} = {Acc′, Occ′}. Then Γ
d
⊢
Aca,Abc′, Occ′ which implies that Γ
d′
⊢ Oab.
Subcase 2.2. For some c, c′ ∈ C, {ρ, ρ̂} = {Ecc′, Icc′}. This subcase
may be divided into the following three subsubcases.
Subsubcase 2.2.1. Γ
d
⊢ Ecc′,Γ
d
0 Icc′. Then Γ
d
⊢ Ac′a, Abc, Ecc′ which
implies that Γ
d′
⊢ Oab.
Subsubcase 2.2.2. Γ
d
0 Ecc′ and Γ
d
⊢ Icc′. Then there is Ea′b′ ∈ BN(C)
such that Γ
d
⊢ Ea′b′ and Γ, Aab
d
⊢ Aca′, Ac′b′; while Γ
d
0 Aca′ or Γ
d
0 Ac′b′,
but -by the consistency of Γ- not both.
This subsubcase may be further divided into two subsubsubcases.
Subsubsubcase 2.2.2.1. Γ
d
0 Aca′ but Γ
d
⊢ Ac′b′. Then Γ
d
⊢ Icc′, Ea′b′, Ac′b′,
Aca, Aba′ from which Γ
d′
⊢ Oab follows.
Subsubsubcase 2.2.2.2. Γ
d
⊢ Aca′ but Γ
d
0 Ac′b′. Similar to subsubsubcase
2.2.2.1.
Subsubcase 2.2.3. Γ
d
0 Ecc′ and Γ
d
0 Icc′. Then there is Ea′b′ ∈ BN(C)
such that Γ
d
⊢ Ac′a, Abc, Ea′b′ and Γ, Aab
d
⊢ Aca′, Ac′b′, while Γ
d
0 Aca′ or
Γ
d
0 Ac′b′. But the consistency of Γ implies that Γ
d
⊢ Ac′b′, then Γ
d
0 Aca′,
then Γ
d
⊢ Aca,Aba′. In particular, Γ
d
⊢ Ac′a, Ac′b′, Aba′, Ea′b′, hence the re-
sult. 
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REMARK 8.8. In a different context, Smith (1983):
1. Excluded subcase 2.1 under the claim that it is impossible that Γ
d
⊢
Occ′.
2. Subsubcase 2.2.3 was deemed to be impossible.
9. Models of NF (C) revisited. An NF (C)-structure B is said to be
a d′-model if for every Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C), Γ B σ whenever Γ
d′
⊢ σ.
An immediate consequence of this definition is:
PROPOSITION 9.1. An NF (C)-structure B =< B,A∗, E∗, I∗, O∗, µ > is
a d′-model iff it is a d-model (hence satisfying conditions 1-4 of proposition
2.3) and:
5. (I∗µ|A∗µ) ⊆ I∗µ ⊆
`
I∗µ.
6. (I∗µ|E∗µ)∪(O∗µ|
`
A∗µ)∪(
`
A∗µ |O∗µ) ⊆ O∗µ. 
Along the lines of the proofs of lemma 2.5, theorem 2.6 and theorem 2.10,
the following may be proved:
THEOREM 9.2. For every Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C):
1. BΓd′ is a d
′-model (of Γd
′
, hence of Γ).
2. d′-deduction is sound and complete with respect to the class of d′-
models. That is Γ
d′
⊢ σ iff Γ
d′
 σ.
3. Γ
d′
 σ iff Γ1
d′
 σ for some finite Γ1 ⊆ Γ.
(This is called d′-compactness). 
REMARK 9.3. All remarks given in remarks and definitions 2.11 hold with
“d′” replacing “d”. All proofs of the original versions essentially go through;
the only exception is the first remark, whose modified version may be proved
by part 2 of proposition 8.4.
THEOREM 9.4. An NF (C)-structure B(=< B,A∗, E∗, I∗, O∗, µ >) is a g-
model iff it is a d′-model and:
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1. A∗µ ∩ O∗µ = φ = E∗µ ∩ I∗µ, or
2. A∗µ = E∗µ = I∗µ = O∗µ = µ(C)× µ(C).
Proof. Only if: By part 2 of proposition 8.4 and an obvious generalization of
part 3 of remarks and definitions 2.11.
If: Every NF (C)-structure which satisfies condition 2 is a g-model. So,
assume that B is a d′-model which satisfies condition 1. To see that it is a
g-model, let Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C), Γ
g
⊢ σ and B  Γ. By remark 9.3, Γ is con-
sistent, hence by theorem 8.7, Γ
d′
⊢ σ, hence B  σ. 
Theorem 9.4 fully characterizes the class of g-models, as was promised
after the proof of theorem 2.10.
DEFINITIONS and remarks 9.5.
1. For an NF (C)-structure B and a relation symbol W ∈ {A,E, I, O},
define BtWB (the basic W -theory of B), Bt+B (the basic positive theory
of B), Bt−B (the basic negative theory of B) and BtB (the basic theory of
B) as follows:
BtWB = {Wab ∈ BN(C) : B Wab}.
Bt+B = BtAB ∪ BtIB.
Bt−B = BtEB ∪ BtOB.
BtB = Bt+B ∪ Bt−B.
So two NF (C)-structures are B-equivalent iff they have the same basic
theory.
For i ∈ 2 let Bi(=< Bi, Ai, Ei, Ii, Oi, µi >) be an NF (C)-structure.
2. Bo is said to be a substructure of B1 and B1 is said to be a su-
perstructure of Bo if Bo ⊆ B1, µo = µ1 and for every W ∈ {A,E, I, O},
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Wo = W1 ∩ (Bo × Bo). If, morever, Bo = Range µ1 (= Range µo), Bo is
said to be a core substructure of B1. Obviously each NF (C)-structure has
a unique core substructure, to be called its core substructure. Bo is a core
substructure of some NF (C)-structure iff it is the core substructure of itself
iff Bo = Range µo. In this case Bo is said to be a core structure. Obviously
every canonical structure is a core structure.
Bo, B1 have the same core substructure iff µo = µ1 and BtBo = BtB1.
3. IfBo is a substructure ofB1 then they have the same core substructure
and the three structures have the same basic theory. Hence for e ∈ {d, d′, g}
if one of them is an e-model, so also are the other two.
In this case Bo is said to be an e-submodel of B1, and B1 is said to be
an e-supermodel of Bo; and the core substructure is said also to be the core
e-submodel. If a core structure is an e-model, it is said to be a core e-model.
4. Bo is said to be a positive semisubstructure of B1 and B1 is said to
be a positive semisuperstructure of Bo if Bo ⊆ B1, µo = µ1 and:
Wo = W1 ∩ (Bo × Bo) for every W ∈ {A, I},
Wo ⊆W1 ∩ (Bo × Bo) for every W ∈ {E,O}.
In this case Bt+Bo = Bt
+
B1 and Bt
−
Bo ⊆ Bt
−
B1. For each e ∈
{d, d′, g} if, in addition, Bo and B1 are both e-models, it is said also that Bo
is a positive e-semisubmodel of B1 and B1 is a positive e-semisupermodel of
Bo.
THEOREM 9.6. For each e ∈ {d′, g} if fBo (defined as above) is a consistent
core e-model then there is an order model B1(=< B1, A1, µ1 >) such that:
1. B1 is a positive e-semisupermodel of Bo.
2. If Ao is a partial ordering, then so also is A1.
3. If Bo is complete, then it is the core e-submodel of B1.
For e = d, the above holds after weakening part 1 to become:
1′. Bo ⊆ B1, µo = µ1, BtBo ⊆ BtB1, and Ao = A1 ∩ (Bo × Bo); hence
BtABo = Bt
A
B1.
Proof. Let e ∈ {d, d′, g} and let Bo be a consistent core e-model. Put:
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B′ = {{ao, a1} ⊆ Bo :< ao, a1 >∈ Io or < a1, ao >∈ Io, and {ao, a1} has
no Ao-lower bound},
B1 = Bo ∪ B
′ (Bo, B
′ may be assumed disjoint),
A1 = Ao∪ lB′∪{< {ao, a1}, a2 >∈ B
′×Bo :< ao, a2 >∈ Ao or < a1, a2 >∈
Ao},
µ1 = µo
A1 is reflexive on B1 since Ao is reflexive on Bo. To prove the transitivity
of A1, let < bo, b1 >,< b1, b2 >∈ A1. If < bo, b1 > or < b1, b2 > belongs
to lB′ then < bo, b2 >∈ A1, else < b1, b2 >∈ Ao. If < bo, b1 >∈ Ao then
< bo, b2 >∈ A1. It remains to consider the case where bo = {ao, a1} for some
{ao, a1} ∈ B
′ such that < ao, b1 >∈ Ao or < a1, b1 >∈ Ao, in both cases
< bo, b2 >∈ A1. So A1 is transitive. Hence < B1, A1, µ1 > is an order model,
which is to be denoted by “B1”.
To prove part 2 it suffices to notice that if < bo, b1 >,< b1, bo >∈ A1 then
they both belong to Ao or both belong to lB′ .
To prove parts 1, 1′ notice that Bo ⊆ B1 and, by the disjointness of Bo, B
′,
Ao = A1 ∩ (Bo × Bo). Let < ao, a1 >∈ Io. If {ao, a1} has an Ao-lower bound
then it is an A1-lower bound, else the element {ao, a1} ∈ B1 is an A1-lower
bound of the subset {ao, a1} ⊆ B1. In both cases < ao, a1 >∈ I1, hence
Io ⊆ I1 ∩ (Bo ×Bo).
At this point the proof forks into two branches:
(i) Assume e ∈ {d′, g} and let < ao, a1 >∈ I1 ∩ (Bo × Bo). To show that
< ao, a1 >∈ Io several cases have to be considered, following is one of them,
the others are similar or easier.
There is < a2, a3 >∈ Io such that < a2, ao >,< a3, a1 >∈ Ao. Since Bo =
Range µo then, by theorem 9.4 and part 5 of proposition 9.1, < ao, a1 >∈ Io.
So I1 ∩ (Bo ×Bo) ⊆ Io. Hence Io = I1 ∩ (Bo × Bo).
That Eo ⊆ E1 ∩ (Bo×Bo) and Oo ⊆ O1 ∩ (Bo×Bo) is guaranteed by the
consistency of Bo. This completes the proof of 1.
(ii) The other branch is e = d. To show that Eo ⊆ E1 assume that there
is < ao, a1 >∈ (Eo −E1), then < ao, a1 >∈ I1, then {ao, a1} has an A1-lower
bound. To show that this is absurd, several cases have to be considered;
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following is one of them, the others are easier or similar.
There is < a2, a3 >∈ Io such that < a3, ao >,< a2, a1 >∈ Ao. Since
Bo = Range µo then, by parts 3, 4 of proposition 2.3, < a2, a3 >∈ Eo which
contradicts the consistency of Bo.
That Oo ⊆ O1 is guaranteed by the consistency of Bo, since Ao =
A1 ∩ (Bo × Bo). This completes the proof of 1
′ and ends the forkation.
For e ∈ {d, d′, g}, if Bo is complete then “⊆” may be replaced by “=” at
the appropriate places, which proves part 3. 
Taking the relationship between the e-models (e ∈ {d, d′, g}) and their
respective core e-submodels into consideration, a weaker result, which holds
for a wider class of e-models, immediately follows:
COROLLARY 9.7. For e ∈ {d, d′, g}, if B is an e-model whose core e-
submodel is consistent, then there is an order model B′ such that
BtB ⊆ BtB′. Moreover,
Bt+B = Bt+B′ if e ∈ {d′, g},
BtAB = BtAB′ if e = d. 
In view of the last part of subsection 2.5, the above corollary may be
immediately strengthened as follows:
COROLLARY 9.8. In the above corollary “an order model” may be replaced
by “a partial order model which is a c.o.m and a Venn model at the same
time”. 
Part 4 of theorem 1.12 may be extended to the case e = d′, to get a
result similar to that obtained there for the case e = g; the result obtained
(there) for the case e = d is weaker. Call the collection of these three results
“syntactical congruence”.
Syntactical congruence together with the definitions of core e-models
(e ∈ {d, d′, g}) yield semantical congruence as formulated by parts 1 and 2
of the next theorem. Part 3 of the same theorem (whose proof is straightfor-
ward) strengthens the conclusion of part 2, under some additional condition.
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Alternatively, semantical congruence may be directly proved by the charac-
terizations of e-models (e ∈ {d, d′, g}) given in propositions 2.3 and 9.1 and
theorem 9.4.
THEOREM 9.9. Let e ∈ {d, d′, g} and let B =< B,A∗, E∗, I∗, O∗, µ > be a
core e-model (consistent or not). Put ∼ = A∗∩
`
A∗, then:
1. ∼ is a congruence relation on < B,A∗, E∗, µ > and A∗/ ∼ is a partial
ordering on B/ ∼.
Moreover, for e ∈ {d′, g}:
2. ∼ is a congruence relation on B. The mapping b 7−→ b/ ∼ is an
epimorphism from B onto B/ ∼. Hence B/ ∼ is a core e-model which is
basically equivalent to B.
3. If B is, in addition, an order model, then B/ ∼ is also a partial order
model. 
For e ∈ {d′, g}, semantical congruence makes it possible to replace “Bo”
in theorem 9.6 by “Bo/ ∼”. This provides, for e ∈ {d
′, g}, an alternative
proof of a weaker form of corollary 9.8, where the partial order model may
be neither concrete nor Venn.
The corresponding weaker result for the case e = d may likewise be ob-
tained, but the alternative proof is a bit more involved.
REMARKS and definitions 9.10.
1. Theorem 9.6 (or corollary 9.7) and corollary 9.8 (or its weaker forms)
provide, respectively, direct ways to order models and partial order models
for consistent Γ(⊆ BN(C)). Simply in each of them let the core e-model
be the canonical structure BΓe(e ∈ {d, d
′, g}). In the case of corollary 9.8
the partial order model may be required to be a concrete order model and a
Venn model at the same time.
2. Let e ∈ {d, d′, g} and let C be a class of NF (C)-structures, then:
1. e is said to be C-strongly semantically complete if for every Γ ⊆
BN(C) there is B ∈ C such that BtB = Γe.
2. e is said to be C-syntactically complete if for every Γ∪{σ} ⊆ BN(C),
Γ
e
⊢ σ whenever Γ C σ.
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3. e is said to be C-consistently syntactically complete if for every
e-consistent Γ ⊆ BN(C) and every σ ∈ BN(C), Γ
e
⊢ σ whenever Γ C σ.
4. e is said to be C-consistently semantically complete if every e-
consistent Γ ⊆ BN(C) has a model in C.
For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the condition given in clause i implies the condition
given in clause i+ 1.
3. Put:
Or = the class of all order models,
Po = the class of all partial order models,
Le = the set of all Leibniz models,
Co = the class of all concrete order models,
V e = the class of all Venn models.
And for e ∈ {d, d′, g} put:
Be = {BΓe : Γ ⊆ BN(C)}.
Also put:
M = {Or, Po, Le, Co, V e} ∪ {Be : e ∈ {d, d′, g}}.
4. Le ∪ Co ⊆ Po ⊆ Or, Bg ⊆ Bd′ ⊆ Bd.
5. Every element of
⋃
M is a d-model.
Every element of (
⋃
M −Bd) ∪ Bd′ is a d′-model.
Every element of (
⋃
M −Bd) ∪ Bg is a g-model.
6. For e ∈ {d, d′, g}, e is Be-strongly semantically complete.
For C ∈M − {Le}, d (respectively d′, g) is C-consistently semantically
(respectively consistently syntactically, syntactically) complete. If C is finite,
the exclusion of Le may be dropped.
7. For e ∈ {d, d′, g} and Γ ⊆ BN(C), Γ is said to be e-syntactically
complete if for every σ ∈ BN(C), Γ
e
⊢ σ or Γ
e
⊢ σ̂.
8. For e ∈ {d, d′, g} and C ∈ M − {Le}, if Γ is consistent and e-
syntactically complete then there isB ∈ C such that BtB = Γe. If, moreover,
CΓ is finite, the exclusion of Le may be dropped.
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10. Decidability revisited.
THEOREM 10.1. For each e ∈ {d, d′, g} there is a polynomial (of degree at
most 8) time algorithm to decide for any < Γ, σ >∈ ℘(BN(C)) × BN(C)
whether Γ
e
⊢ σ, provided that Γ is essentially finite and:
Γ ∩ ({Ecc : c ∈ (C − CΓ)} ∪ {Occ : c ∈ (C − CΓ)}) = φ.
Proof. For e = d a proof may be obtained by slightly modifying the appro-
priate parts of the proof of theorem 3.2.
In view of lemma 8.3, a proof for the case e = d′ may be obtained along
the same lines as above.
In view of remarks 3.1, the first part of this theorem may be made use of to
determine whether Γ is inconsistent. If yes, Γ
g
⊢ σ; else Γ
g
⊢ σ iff Γ
d′
⊢ σ, by the-
orem 8.7. 
11. Sorites. Soriteses are well known in Aristotelian syllogistic (see
Hurley, P. J. 1982, p. 201; Rosenthal, M. and Yudin, R (eds.) 1967, p. 423;
also cf. Boger, G. 1998, pp. 197-8; Smiley, T.J. 1973, pp. 139-40).
The notion of a sorites may be explicated as follows.
DEFINITION 11.1. Let e ∈ {d, d′} and let Γ ⊆ BN(C). An annotation of
an e-deduction < σi >i∈k from Γ is said to be an e-sorites annotation if the
following conditions are satisfied:
1. σi 6= σj whenever i 6= j (i, j ∈ k).
2. For i ∈ k − 1, σi is involved in the annotation of another sentence in
the following and only in the following way.
2.1. If 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 3 then exactly one of the following holds:
2.1.1. σi+1 is annotated as the consequent of σi by some e-rule with one
premise.
2.1.2. σi+1 is annotated as the consequent of σi−1, σi or σi, σi−1 by some
e-rule with two premises.
2.1.3. σi+2 is annotated as the consequent of σi, σi+1 or σi+1, σi by some
e-rule with two premises.
2.2. If 1 ≤ i = k − 2 then exactly one of 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 holds.
2.3. If i = 0 then exactly one of the following holds:
2.3.1. k = 2 and 2.1.1 holds.
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2.3.2. k > 2 and exactly one of 2.1.1 and 2.1.3 holds.
An e-sorites from Γ is an e-deduction from Γ which admits a sorites
annotation. An e-sorites of σ(∈ BN(C)) from Γ is an e-deduction of σ from
Γ which is an e-sorites. In case there is such a sorites, we write “Γ
es
⊢ σ”.
Condition 2 of the above definition entails that, with the exception of the
last sentence, every sentence occurring in an e-sorites from Γ is made use
of exactly once as a premise of some application of some e-rule, and in this
(hence in each) application the premise or the premises immediately precede
the consequent.
For e ∈ {d, d′} there is, obviously, a set Γ ⊆ BN(C) and an e-deduction
from Γ which is not an e-sorites from Γ. So the best we may hope for is to
find an e-sorites of σ from Γ, for every Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C) such that Γ
e
⊢ σ.
Even this is not always attainable.
Let Γo = {Aca, Ebc} and Γ1 = {Acx,Ebx, Ica}, then for i ∈ 2, Γi is
consistent and Γi
d′
⊢ Oab, but not Γi
d′s
⊢ Oab. For i = 0, adding the rule Eab
Oab
(E-sub) as an additional rule of inference will solve the problem. Same holds
for i = 1 if, instead, Iba,Ebc
Oac
(Ferison) is added.
11.1. Further extension of direct deduction. Taking into consider-
ation the following two rules of inference.
10. E-sub 11. Ferison
in addition to the ten rules of inference of d′, the d′′-deduction relation “
d′′
⊢”
may be defined along the lines of the definition of “
d
⊢”. Likewise all the other
definitions involving “d” may be modified in an obvious way to give corre-
sponding definitions involving “d′′”.
PROPOSITION 11.2. For Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C),
Γ
d′
⊢ σ iff Γ
d′′
⊢ σ.
Proof. One direction is obvious, the other is easy. 
DEFINITION/remark 11.3. The d′′-models may be defined along the lines
of the definition of the d′-models.
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By the above proposition they are the same.
THEOREM 11.4. Let Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C) and e ∈ {d, d′, d′′} then:
Γ
es
⊢ σ whenever Γ
e
⊢ σ
provided one of the following conditions holds:
1. σ is affirmative,
2. σ is universal negative and Γ is consistent,
3. σ is particular negative, e = d or Γ is consistent and e = d′′.
The other direction unconditionally holds, so the two sides are equivalent
if Γ is consistent and e ∈ {d, d′′}.
Proof. Assume Γ
e
⊢ σ. Distinguish between the following cases.
1. σ = Aab, for some a, b ∈ C. By proposition 11.2 and lemma 8.3
there is an a-b chain in Γ, < ci >i∈n say. We may assume that this chain is
injective. If n = 1, then there is an e-sorites of σ from Γ of length 1. Else
n ≥ 2; define < ρi >i∈2n−3 as follows:
ρ2j = Acocj+1 = Aacj+1 j ∈ n− 1,
ρ2j+1 = Acj+1cj+2 j ∈ n− 2.
Then < ρi >i∈2n−3 is an e-sorites of σ from Γ.
2. σ = Iab, for some a, b ∈ C. If e = d, the result is an easy consequence
of part 1 of this proof and lemma 8.3. Else, by proposition 11.2 we may
assume that e = d′. By lemma 8.3 it suffices to deal with the following three
subcases (for some a′, b′ ∈ C):
2.1. Ia′b′ ∈ Γ and Γ
d
⊢ Aa′a, Ab′b,
2.2. Ib′a′ ∈ Γ and Γ
d
⊢ Aa′a, Ab′b,
2.3. Γ
d
⊢ Aa′a, Aa′b.
Assume 2.1 (the other two subcases are not harder), then there are an a′-a
chain and a b′-b chain in Γ, let them be, respectively < ci >i∈k and < c
′
j >j∈l.
We may assume that the ranges of these two chains are disjoint, otherwise this
subcase will be reduced to subcase 2.3. Also we may assume that each of these
two chains is injective. The following is a d′ (hence a d′′)-sorites of σ from
Γ: Ab′c′1, Ac
′
1c
′
2, Ab
′c′2, ..., Ab
′c′l−2, Ac
′
l−2b, Ab
′b, Ia′b′, Ia′b, Iba′, Aa′c1, Ibc1, ...,
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Ibck−2, Ack−2a, Iba, Iab.
3. σ = Eab, for some a, b ∈ C and Γ is consistent. By proposition
11.2 and lemma 8.3 there are a′, b′ ∈ C such that {Ea′b′, Eb′a′} ∩ Γ 6= φ
and there are an a-a′ chain and a b-b′ chain in Γ, let them be, respec-
tively, < ci >i∈k and < c
′
j >j∈l. By the consistency of Γ, the ranges of
the two chains are disjoint. Moreover, we may assume that each of them
is injective. Let Ea′b′ ∈ Γ (the other case is not harder), then the follow-
ing is an e-sorites of σ from Γ: Ea′b′, Ack−2a
′, Eck−2b
′, ..., Ec1b
′, Aac1, Eab
′,
Eb′a, Ac′l−2b
′, Ec′l−2a, ..., Ec
′
1a, Abc
′
1, Eba, Eab.
4. σ = Oab, for some a, b ∈ C. If e = d, then there is a one line e-sorites
of σ from Γ. Else assume that Γ is consistent and e = d′′, by proposition
11.2 and lemma 8.3 it suffices to deal with the following two subcases.
4.1. There are a′, b′ ∈ C such that Oa′b′ ∈ Γ and Γ
d
⊢ Aa′a, Abb′. Making
use of Bocardo and Baroco it may be shown, along the lines of part 3 of this
proof, that there is a d′ (hence a d′′)-sorites of σ from Γ.
4.2. There is c ∈ C such that Γ
d′
⊢ Ica, Ecb. As in part 3 of this proof,
there are c′, b′ ∈ C such that:
{Ec′b′, Eb′c′} ∩ Γ 6= φ and Γ
d
⊢ Acc′, Abb′ (∗)
By lemma 8.3 it suffices to deal with the following two subsubcases.
4.2.1. For some c′′ ∈ C, Γ
d
⊢ Ac′′c, Ac′′a. By this and (∗), Γ
d
⊢ Abb′, Ac′′c′,
Ac′′a. So there are b-b′, c′′-c′ and c′′-a injective Γ-chains; let them be< xi >i∈k
, < yi >i∈l and < zi >i∈m respectively.
By the consistency of Γ, the range of < xi >i∈k and the union of the
ranges of < yi >i∈l and < zi >i∈m are disjoint. Assume that the ranges of
< yi >i∈l and < zi >i∈m have c
′′ only in common (the other case is similar).
If Ec′b′ ∈ Γ, then there is a d′ (hence a d′′)-sorites of σ from Γ. Else Eb′c′ ∈
Γ and the following is a d′′-sorites of σ from Γ. Abx1, Ax1x2, Abx2, ..., Abxk−2,
Axk−2b
′, Abb′, Eb′c′, Ebc′, Ec′b, Ayl−2c
′, Eyl−2b, ..., Ey1b, Ac
′′y1, Ec
′′b, Oc′′b
(here E-sub is made use of), Ac′′z1, Oz1b, Az1z2, Oz2b, ..., Ozm−2b, Azm−2a,
Oab.
4.2.2. {Ic′′a′, Ia′c′′} ∩ Γ 6= φ and Γ
d
⊢ Ac′′c, Aa′a, for some c′′, a′ ∈ C. By
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this and (*), Γ
d
⊢ Abb′, Ac′′c′, Aa′a. So there are b-b′, c′′-c′ and a′-a injective
Γ-chains; let them be < xi >i∈k, < yi >i∈l and < zi >i∈m respectively.
By the consistency of Γ, the range of < xi >i∈k and the union of the
ranges of < yi >i∈l and < zi >i∈m are disjoint. If the ranges of < yi >i∈l and
< zi >i∈m are not disjoint, this case will be reduced to the above case; so
assume that they are disjoint.
If Ia′c′′ ∈ Γ then there is a d′ (hence a d′′)-sorites of σ from Γ. Else
Ic′′a′ ∈ Γ, assume Eb′c′ ∈ Γ (the other case is similar), then the following is
a d′′-sorites of σ from Γ. Abx1, Ax1x2, Abx2, ..., Abb
′, Eb′c′, Ebc′, Ec′b, Ayl−2c
′,
Eyl−2b, ..., Ec
′′b, Ic′′a′, Oa′b (here Ferison is made use of), Aa′z1, Oz1b, ..., Oab.
PROPOSITION 11.5. If Γ(⊆ BN(C)) is inconsistent then it is ds-inconsistent,
in the sense that there is σ ∈ BN(C) such that Γ
ds
⊢ σ, σ̂.
Proof. Let Γ be inconsistent, then there is a universal ρ ∈ BN(C) such that
Γ
d
⊢ ρ, ρ̂. Distinguish between two cases:
1. ρ = Aab, for some a, b ∈ C. In this case the result is a direct conse-
quence of theorem 11.4.
2. ρ = Eab, for some a, b ∈ C. As in part 3 of the proof of theorem 11.4,
there are a′, b′ ∈ C such that {Ea′b′, Eb′a′} ∩ Γ 6= φ and there are injective
a-a′, b-b′ chains in Γ; let them be, respectively, < ci >i∈k and < c
′
j >j∈l.
If the ranges of these chains are disjoint, the result follows by theorem 11.4
and the methods made use of in its proof. Else there is c′′ ∈ {ci : i ∈ k}∩{c
′
j :
j ∈ l}. Then there are injective c′′-a′, c′′-b′ chains in Γ. Along the lines of
the proof of theorem 11.4 it may be shown that Γ
ds
⊢ Ea′c′′, Ia′c′′ (and Γ
ds
⊢
Eb′c′′, Ib′c′′). 
To show that the consistency condition in each of the parts 2,3 of theorem
11.4 cannot be completely dispensed with, we prove:
PROPOSITION 11.6. Let Γ ⊆ BN(C), e ∈ {d, d′, d′′} and a, a′, b, b′, c, c′ ∈ C;
and assume that c 6= c′.
1. If every a-a′ chain in Γ is a < c, c′ > chain, then Acc′ occurs as an
assumption in every e-deduction of Aaa′ from Γ; moreover it is made use of
as a premise in the deduction if it is different from Aaa′.
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In parts 2 and 3 below, Ebb′ is assumed to be the only universal negative
sentence in Γ.
2. If every a-b chain and every a-b′ chain in Γ is a < c, c′ > chain, then
Acc′ occurs as an assumption and is made use of as a premise in every e-
deduction of Eaa′ and every e-deduction of Ea′a from Γ.
3. If every a-b chain, every a-b′ chain, every a′-b chain and every a′-b′
chain in Γ is a < c, c′ > chain, then for every injective e-deduction < σi >i∈k
of Eaa′ from Γ there is j ∈ k such that σj is made use of as a premise at
least twice.
In parts 4 and 5 below, Obb′ is assumed to be the only negative sentence
in Γ.
4. If every b-a chain or every a′-b′ chain in Γ is a < c, c′ > chain, then Acc′
occurs as an assumption and is made use of as a premise in every e-deduction
of Oaa′ from Γ.
5. If every b-a chain and every a′-b′ chain in Γ is a < c, c′ > chain, then
for every injective e-deduction < σi >i∈k of Oaa
′ from Γ there is j ∈ k such
that σj is made use of as a premise at least twice.
Proof. Generalize the first part to become:
For every u, u′ ∈ C, if every u-u′ chain in Γ is a < c, c′ > chain, then Acc′
occurs as an assumption in every e-deduction of Auu′ from Γ; moreover, it
is made use of as a premise in the deduction if it is different from Auu′.
The stronger statement may be easily proved by course of values induction
on the length of the e-deduction.
Parts 2 and 4 may be proved similarly.
Again generalize part 3 to become:
For every u, u′ ∈ C if every u-b chain, every u-b′ chain, every u′-b chain
and every u′-b′ chain in Γ is a < c, c′ > chain, then for every injective e-
deduction < σi >i∈k of Euu
′ from Γ there is j ∈ k such that σj is made use
of as a premise at least twice.
The stronger statement may be proved by course of values induction on
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k as follows. Assume the required for r < k and let < σi >i∈k be an e-
deduction of Euu′ from Γ. Since {b, b′}, {u, u′} are disjoint and σk−1 = Euu
′,
then there are only two cases to consider:
1. For some l < k − 1, σl = Eu
′u, in this case the result is immediate by
the induction hypothesis.
2. For some l, m < k − 1 and some v ∈ C it is the case that l < m,
{σl, σm} = {Auv,Evu
′} and σk−1 is obtained from them as the conclusion of
applying the rule Auv,Evu
′
Euu′
.
If σl is made use of as a premise in a step whose conclusion is σj for some
j < k−1, the result is immediate. Also if there is some u-v chain in Γ which
is not a < c, c′ > chain, the result follows by the induction hypothesis.
So it remains to assume that every u-v chain in Γ is a < c, c′ > chain and
for every j < k−1, σl is not made use of as a premise in the step which gives
rise to σj . Put:
∆o = {σl},
∆j+1 = ∆j ∪ {σi : i ∈ l and σi is made use of as a premise
in a step whose conclusion is in ∆j}.
Then for some n, ∆n+1 = ∆n. Hence < σi >i∈l+1,σi∈∆n is an e-deduction
of σl from Γ, so by parts 1,2 above Acc
′ ∈ ∆n.
Assume, towards a contradiction, that for every i ∈ k, σi is made use of
as a premise at most once. Then < σi >i∈m+1,σi /∈∆n is an e-deduction of σm
from Γ−∆n. Again by parts 1,2 above, Acc
′ /∈ ∆n. Hence the result.
Part 5 may be proved similarly. 
EXAMPLES 11.7. To see that the consistency condition in each of the
parts 2,3 of theorem 11.4 cannot be completely dispensed with, put:
Γo = {Aac, Aa
′c, Acc′, Ac′b, Ac′b′, Ebb′} , σo = Eaa
′
Γ1 = {Aa
′c, Abc, Acc′, Ac′a, Ac′b′, Obb′} , σ1 = Oaa
′.
For i ∈ 2, Γi
d′
⊢ σi (in fact Γo
d
⊢ σo), but by the above proposition Γi
d′′s
0 σi.
This example still works even if d′′ is augmented by all of the Aristotelian
syllogisms.
To see that consistency is not always necessary, just notice that whether
Γ is consistent or not, Γ
ds
⊢ σ whenever σ ∈ Γ.
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Following are basic properties of sorites.
DEFINITIONS and remarks 11.8. Let e ∈ {d, d′, d′′}, Γ ⊆ BN(C) and k ∈
N
+, and let < σi >i∈k be an e-sorites of σk−1 from Γ according to some
annotation.
1. Two annotations of an e-deduction from Γ are said to be essentially
the same if the only difference between them is interchanging “assumption”
(i.e. the corresponding sentence belongs to Γ) and “A-Id” in some places. An
e-deduction from Γ is said to have essentially one, or unique, annotation (of
some sort) if all of its annotations (of this sort) are essentially the same.
2. For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, < σi >i∈ℓ is an e-sorites from Γ according to the
restriction of the given annotation iff ℓ = 1 or the annotation of σℓ−1 is
neither “A-Id” nor “assumption”.
3. Let 1 ≤ ℓ < k, then for at least one j ∈ {ℓ, ℓ + 1}, < σi >i∈j is an
e-sorites from Γ according to the restriction of the given annotation.
4. For e ∈ {d, d′}, every e-sorites from Γ has essentially one sorites anno-
tation. This does not apply to d′′, for the d′′-deduction < Ixx,Exy,Oxy >
has two d′′-sorites annotations which are not essentially the same. Only one
of them is a d′-sorites annotation.
5. Ferison and E-sub are the only d′′-rules which are not d′-rules. In every
d′′-sorites annotation at most one of them is made use of, at most once.
6. In each d′′-sorites at most one triple of the form < Ixx,Exy,Oxy >
or < Exy, Ixx,Oxy > occurs, at most once.
If no such triple occurs, the sorities will have an essentially unique d′′-
sorites annotation. Else all of its d′′-sorites annotations are essentially the
same, with the only exception that an occurrence of “Oxy” may be anno-
tated as the consequence of the preceding two sentences by Ferio (which is a
d′-rule) in some of them and by Ferison (which is not) in the others.
12. Independence.
DEFINITIONS 12.1. Let e be a deduction system and let r be a rule of e.
The deduction system obtained from e by excluding r will be denoted by
“er”.
1. r is said to be derivable in e if Γ
er
⊢ σ whenever Γ is a set of antecedents
of an instance of r, and σ is the corresponding conclusion. Otherwise r is
said to be independent in e.
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2. e is said to be independent if each of its rules is independent in it.
3. r is said to be weakly independent in e if for some set ∆ ∪ {ρ} of
sentences, ∆
e
⊢ ρ while ∆
er
0 ρ.
4. e is said to be weakly independent if each of its rules is weakly inde-
pendent in it.
REMARKS 12.2.
1. Independence implies weak independence.
2. For e ∈ {d, d′, d′′}, each rule r of e is independent in e iff it is weakly
independent in e, hence e is independent iff it is weakly independent.
3. Each of d, d′ is independent (cf. Glashoff (2005) where similar results
are obtained via brute force computation).
4. The independence of each of ds and d′s is an immediate consequence
of the independence of each of d and d′ respectively.
THEOREM 12.3.
1. E-sub, Ferio and Ferison are derivable in d′′s, hence in d′′. Each of the
other rules of d′′ is independent in d′′, hence in d′′s.
2. d′′ is not independent, hence not weakly independent.
3. d′′s is weakly independent; however, it is not independent.
Proof.
1. The sequence Aaa, Iaa, Eab, Oab shows that E-sub is derivable in d′′s.
The corresponding proofs for Ferio and Ferison are not harder.
Put r = Bocardo and let a, b, c be three pairwise distinct elements of C.
Put Γ = {Aba,Obc} and σ = Oac. It is easy to see that if Γ
d′′
⊢ ρ then
ρ ∈ {Aba,Obc, Iab, Iba} ∪ {Axx : x ∈ C} ∪ {Ixx : x ∈ C}. From this the
independence of r in d′′ follows. Similarly the other required results may be
obtained.
2. By part 1 above and part 2 of remarks 12.2.
3. Part 1 above shows that d′′s is not independent. It shows also that to
prove the weak independence of d′′s it suffices to deal with E-sub, Ferio and
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Ferison only.
Put r = E-sub and let ∆ = {Eab} and ρ = Oba, for some distinct
a, b ∈ C. ∆
d′′s
⊢ Oba. To see that ∆
d′′sr
0 Oba notice that the only d′′sr
rules which yield an O-sentence are Ferio, Baroco, Bocardo, and Ferison. To
obtain Oba by applying Baroco or Bocardo the O-sentence occurring as one
of the antecedents -in the present case- will be the same as the conclusion,
which is forbidden in sorites. To apply Ferio or Ferison, the antencedents -in
the present case- must be Ibb and Eba. But if ηi, ηi+1, ηi+2 is a subsequence
of a d′′sr sorites deduction from ∆ and the annotation of ηi+2 is that it is
obtained from ηi, ηi+1 or ηi+1, ηi by some rule, then ηi+1 ∈ ∆∪{Acc : c ∈ C}.
So neither Ferio nor Ferison is applicable, hence ∆
d′′sr
0 Oba.
Next, put r = Ferio (Ferison) and let ∆ = {Eab, Icb} ({Eab, Ibc}) and
ρ = Oca for some pairwise distinct a, b, c ∈ C. By a slight modification of the
above technique it may be shown that ∆
d′′s
⊢ ρ, but ∆
d′′sr
0 ρ. 
12.1. Independence of g and variations thereof. g and d have the
same deduction rules, but the notion of g-deduction is weaker than that of
d-deduction. By definition 1.9, for Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C), Γ
g
⊢ σ iff Γ ∪ {σ̂} is
d-inconsistent. Likewise for each rule r of g (equivalently of d) define the
gr-deduction relation “
gr
⊢” by: Γ
gr
⊢ σ iff Γ ∪ {σ̂} is dr-inconsistent. From this
and remarks 12.2 it easily follows that r is independent in g iff it is weakly
independent in g, hence g is independent iff it is weakly independent.
THEOREM 12.4. g is independent.
Proof. Let a, b, c be pairwise distinct elements of C, and put r = Barbara
and Γ = {Aab, Abc}. Γ
gr
0 Aac iff Γ ∪ {Oac} is dr-consistent. But the set of
all dr-consequences of Γ ∪ {Oac} is {Aab, Abc, Oac, Iba, Icb} ∪ {Axx : x ∈
C}∪{Ixx : x ∈ C}, hence Γ∪{Oac} is dr-consistent. Consequently Barbara
is independent in g.
The proofs of the independence of the other rules are similar or easier. 
To get closer to the usual deduction systems, we introduce two new de-
duction systems g′, g′′ and show that each of them is equivalent to g and
discuss its independence.
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12.1.1. First variation on g. The deduction system g′ is obtained by
augmenting the system d′ by the rule: ρ,ρ̂
σ
(contradiction, Co for short).
Let Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C). It is easy to see that if Γ
g′
⊢ σ then there is a
g′-deduction of σ from Γ in which Co is never made use of or it is made use
of only at the last step; moreover, this applies to g′r for each rule r of d
′.
THEOREM 12.5. The following are equivalent:
1. Γ
g
⊢ σ,
2. Γ
g′
⊢ σ,
3. Γ
d′
⊢ σ or Γ is inconsistent,
4. Γ ∪ {σ̂} is inconsistent.
Proof. Easy if Γ is inconsistent; and in all cases parts 1 and 4 are equivalent
by definition 1.9.
Assume Γ is consistent. By theorem 8.7, parts 1 and 3 are equivalent, and
by the definition of g′, part 3 implies part 2. Finally assume part 2, then there
is a g′-deduction of σ from Γ in which Co is never made use of, this implies
part 3. 
The following theorem settles the indepenence of g′.
THEOREM 12.6.
1. Every rule of g′ is independent in g′ iff it is weakly independent in g′,
hence g′ is independent iff it is weakly independent.
2. Γ
gco
⊢ σ iff Γ
d′
⊢ σ.
3. For every rule r of d′, Γ
g′r
⊢ σ iff Γ
d′r
⊢ σ or Γ is d′r-inconsistent.
4. g′ is independent.
Proof. The proof of the first three parts is easy.
To prove the last part let a, b ∈ C, then Aab,Oab
Eab
is an instance of Co. But
by lemma 8.3, {Aab,Oab}
d′
0 Eab. So by part 2 above {Aab,Oab}
g′co
0 Eab.
Therefore Co is independent in g′. To complete the proof let r be some other
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rule of g′, then r is a rule of d′. By part 3 above the independence of r in g′
may be proved by choosing a consistent set Γ of antecedents of r such that
Γ
d′r
0 σ, where σ is the corresponding conclusion; which is always possible. 
12.1.2. Second variation on g. Though g′ is closer than g to the contem-
porary deduction systems, it is not as close to the Aristotelian spirit as g.
Inspired by Gentzen-type sequent systems (cf. Kleene, S.C. 1967, p. 306) we
introduce a second variation g′′ on g, which will hopefully be close enough to
both modern and Aristotelian traditions. The deduction rules of g′′ are:
0′.
Γ⊢Aaa
(A-Id′)
1′. Γ⊢Aab
Γ⊢Iba
(Apc′)
2′. Γ⊢Eab
Γ⊢Eba
(Ec′)
3′. Γ⊢Aab,∆⊢Abc
Γ∪∆⊢Aac
(Barbara′)
4′. Γ⊢Aab,∆⊢Ebc
Γ∪∆⊢Eac
(Celarent′)
5′.
Γ⊢η
(Ass)
6′. Γ∪{σ̂}⊢ρ,∆∪{σ̂}⊢ρ̂
Γ∪∆⊢σ
(Raa)
where a, b, c ∈ C, Γ ∪∆ ∪ {ρ, σ} ⊆ BN(C) and η ∈ Γ. “Ass” and “Raa”
are abbreviations for “Assumption” and “Reductio ad absurdum” respectively.
“⊢” is just a symbol, instead we could have made use of ordered pairs and
write, e.g. “< Γ, σ >” in place of “Γ ⊢ σ”.
DEFINITION and remarks 12.7. Let S be a set of sequents, i.e. S ⊆ {Γ ⊢
σ : Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆BN(C)}.
1. A g′′-deduction from S is a sequence < Γi ⊢ σi >i∈k of sequents, where
k ∈ N and for each i ∈ k, Γi ⊢ σi ∈ S or may be obtained from preceding
terms of the sequence by some g′′-deduction rule.
If k 6= 0, < Γi ⊢ σi >i∈k is said to be a g
′′-deduction of Γk−1 ⊢ σk−1 from
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S. In this case we write S
g′′
 Γk−1 ⊢ σk−1.
2. We write “Γ
g′′
⊢ σ” for “φ
g′′
 Γ ⊢ σ”, “g′′-deduction” for “g′′-deduction
from φ” and “g′′-deduction of Γk−1 ⊢ σk−1 (or of ∆ ⊢ ρ)” for “g
′′-deduction
of Γk−1 ⊢ σk−1 (or of ∆ ⊢ ρ) from φ”.
3. The above definition and remark may be generalized to subsystems of
g′′.
4. The notions of derivability, independence and weak independence may
be extended to g′′ in the obvious way.
5. A deduction rule of g′′ is independent in g′′ iff it is weakly independent
in g′′. Hence g′′ is independent iff it is weakly independent.
THEOREM 12.8. For every Γ ∪ {σ} ⊆ BN(C):
Γ
g
⊢ σ iff Γ
g′′
⊢ σ.
Proof. Let Γ
g
⊢ σ then, by definition 1.9, Γ∪{σ̂}
d
⊢ ρ, ρ̂ for some ρ ∈ BN(C).
Let < ξi >i∈k and < ηj >j∈l be, respectively, d-deductions of ρ and ρ̂ from
Γ∪{σ̂}. Then < Γ∪{σ̂} ⊢ ξi >i∈k and < Γ∪{σ̂} ⊢ ηj >j∈l are, respectively,
g′′-deductions of Γ∪{σ̂} ⊢ ρ and Γ∪{σ̂} ⊢ ρ̂. To their concatenation (which
is a g′′-deduction) add one more line to obtain Γ ⊢ σ by Raa from lines k− 1
and k + l − 1. This proves the only if direction.
To prove the other direction let Γ
g′′
⊢ σ, let < ∆i ⊢ ρi >i∈k be a g
′′-
deduction of Γ ⊢ σ, and assume that ∆i
g
⊢ ρi for each i < k − 1. To show
that ∆k−1
g
⊢ ρk−1 we deal with as many cases as there are g
′′-deduction rules.
Following we consider Celarent′ (4′) and Raa (6′), the other cases are similar
or easier.
Celarent′: There are a, b, c ∈ C and j, l ∈ N such that j < l < k − 1,
∆k−1 = ∆j ∪ ∆l, {ρj, ρl} = {Aab, Ebc} and ρk−1 = Eac. By the above as-
sumption ∆j
g
⊢ ρj and ∆l
g
⊢ ρl. Hence ∆k−1(= ∆j ∪∆l)
g
⊢ ρj , ρl. So by part
7 of proposition 1.11, ∆k−1
g
⊢ ρk−1.
Raa: There are Σ,Σ′, η, j, l such that Σ ∪ Σ′ ∪ {η} ⊆ BN(C); j, l ∈ N;
j < l < k − 1, ∆j = Σ ∪ {ρ̂k−1}, ∆l = Σ
′ ∪ {ρ̂k−1}, {ρj , ρl} = {η, η̂}
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and ∆k−1 = Σ ∪ Σ
′. By the above assumption ∆j
g
⊢ ρj and ∆l
g
⊢ ρl. Hence
∆k−1∪{ρ̂k−1}(= ∆j∪∆l)
g
⊢ ρj , ρl. So by part 4 of proposition 1.11 and the rel-
evant definitions, ∆k−1
g
⊢ ρk−1. 
Notice that in the g′′-deductions < Γ ∪ {σ̂} ⊢ ξi >i∈k and < Γ ∪ {σ̂} ⊢
ηj >j∈l which occur in the proof of the only if direction of the above theorem,
only the rules 0′ − 5′ are made use of. Moreover, if Γ
d
⊢ σ, then there is a
g′′-deduction of Γ ⊢ σ in which Raa is never made use of.
This is essentially sufficient to prove the following:
COROLLARY 12.9. If Γ
g′′
⊢ σ then there is a g′′-deduction of Γ ⊢ σ in which
Raa is never made use of or is made use of only in the last step. 
This section is concluded by proving the independence of g′′.
THEOREM 12.10. Let Γ∪{σ} ⊆ BN(C), r be a d-deduction rule, and r′ be
the corresponding g′′-deduction rule.
1. Γ
g′′
r′
⊢ σ iff Γ
gr
⊢ σ,
2. Γ
g′′Ass
⊢ σ iff φ
g′′
⊢ σ iff φ
g
⊢ σ iff φ
d
⊢ σ,
3. Γ
g′′
Raa
⊢ σ iff Γ
d
⊢ σ,
4. g′′ is independent.
Proof. The proofs of the first and the third parts are along the lines of the
proof of theorem 12.8 noting that proposition 1.11 still holds after replacing
“d” ,“g” by “dr” ,“gr” respectively. For part 2 it is sufficient to notice that each
of the four statements holds iff σ is of the form Y cc for some c ∈ C and some
Y ∈ {A, I}.
To prove the last part we consider three cases:
Rules 0′ − 4′: Let r′ be one of these rules and let r be the corresponding
d-rule. Since r is independent in g, there is a set Γ of antecedents of an
instance of r such that Γ
gr
0 σ, where σ is the corresponding conclusion. Put
S = {Γ ⊢ ρ : ρ ∈ Γ} then S is a set of antecedents of r′ and Γ ⊢ σ is the
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corresponding conclusion. By parts 2,3 of definition and remarks 12.7 and
part 1 above:
S
g′′
r′
 Γ ⊢ σ iff φ
g′′
r′
 Γ ⊢ σ iff Γ
g′′
r′
⊢ σ iff Γ
gr
⊢ σ.
But Γ
gr
0 σ, hence r′ is independent in g′′.
Rule Ass: For a, b ∈ C, φ
g′′
 {Oab} ⊢ Oab while, by 2 above, φ
g′′
Ass
1
{Oab} ⊢ Oab. Hence Ass is independent in g′′.
Rule Raa: For distinct elements a, b of C let σ = Iab, ρ = Iba, Γ = {ρ}
and S = {Γ∪{σ̂} ⊢ ρ,Γ∪{σ̂} ⊢ ρ̂} then S is a set of antecedents of Raa and
Γ ⊢ σ is the corresponding conclusion. By a slight modification of the proof
given above for the rules 0′ − 4′ it may be shown that Raa is independent in
g′′. 
13. Algebraic semantics of AAS, a prelude. The most well known
attempt to algebraically interpret Aristotelian syllogistic is that of Boole
(1948, first published 1847); however, it is not the first. More than a century
and a half earlier, this area of research was pioneered by Leibniz (Kneale
and Kneale 1966, pp. 338-45; Lenzen 2004). Following is a discussion of the
subject in general; the works of Leibniz and Boole will be briefly discussed
in section 17 below.
Regarding the central role played by order models in the semantics of
NF (C), they will be our starting point for algebraization. Each underly-
ing order structure of an order model will induce an algebra which may be
expanded to make the interpretation of NF (C) possible.
The simplicity of order models stems from the fact that all relations are
determined by only one of them, namely the interpretation of A, which is
compatible with the Aristotelian view that Barbara is the essential syllogism.
Likewise, algebras defined in this section will each have one (partial) binary
operation and no others.
DEFINITIONS and remarks 13.1.
1. Let B be a non-empty set and let ⊕ be a function from a subset
of B × B to B, then ⊕ is said to be a partial binary operation on B, and
< B,⊕ > is said to be a partial algebra.
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2. Let
◦
≤ be a binary relation on a set B, the partial binary operation + ◦
≤
induced by
◦
≤ on B is defined by:
+ ◦
≤
:
◦
≤ → B
a+ ◦
≤
b = a
+ ◦
≤
is commutative (see 3.3 below) if
◦
≤ is antisymmetric. < B,+ ◦
≤
> is
called the partial algebra induced by < B,
◦
≤>.
3. Let < B,
◦
≤> be an order structure, then < B,+ ◦
≤
> satisfies:
1. Right associativity:
(a+ ◦
≤
b) + ◦
≤
c = a + ◦
≤
(b+ ◦
≤
c)
in the sense that for every a, b, c ∈ B if the rhs exists, so does the lhs and
they are equal.
2. Idempotence:
a+ ◦
≤
a = a all a ∈ B.
If, moreover,
◦
≤ is antisymmetric, then < B,+ ◦
≤
> satisfies:
3. Commutativity:
a + ◦
≤
b = b+ ◦
≤
a
in the sense that for every a, b ∈ B, if both sides exist they are equal.
Honouring Leibniz, a partial algebra < B,⊕ > satisfying conditions 1
and 2 will be called a Leibniz algebra (LA for short). If, moreover, it satisfies
condition 3 it will be called a commutative Leibniz algebra (CLA for short).
So, < B,+ ◦
≤
> is a LA if < B,
◦
≤> is an order structure; moreover, it is
a CLA if
◦
≤ is antisymmetric.
4. An idempotent partial algebra < B,⊕ > will be called a weak Leibniz
algebra (WLA for short) if it satisfies:
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1. Weak right associativity:
(a⊕ b)⊕ c = a⊕ (b⊕ c)
in the sense that for every a, b, c ∈ B if (a⊕ b) and the rhs both exist, then
the lhs exists and equals the rhs.
If, moreover, < B,⊕ > is commutative (in the sense of condition 3.3
above), it will be called a commutative weak Leibniz algebra (CWLA for
short).
Obviously every LA (CLA) is a WLA (CWLA).
5. With abuse of notation, “LA”, “CLA”, “WLA” and “CWLA” will denote
also the classes of all LAs, CLAs, WLAs and CWLAs respectively; what is
intended will be clear from the context.
Abuses of notations such as this may take place later on without further
notice.
6. Let < B,⊕ > be a partial algbra, the binary relation ≤⊕ induced by
⊕ on B is defined by:
≤⊕= {< a, b >∈ B :<< a, b >, a >∈ ⊕},
so a ≤⊕ b iff a ⊕ b = a (in the sense that the lhs exists and equals the rhs).
Obviously, ≤⊕ is antisymmetric if ⊕ is commutative.
7. Let
◦
≤ and ⊕ be, respectively, a binary relation and a partial binary
operation on a set B, and let + ◦
≤
, ≤⊕, ≤+◦
≤
and +≤⊕ be as defined above.
Then:
1. ≤+◦
≤
=
◦
≤.
2. +≤⊕ ⊆ ⊕; moreover, +≤⊕ is commutative if ⊕ is.
8. Let < B,⊕ > be a WLA, then < B,≤⊕> is an order structure, called
the order structure induced by < B,⊕ >. Moreover, ≤⊕ is antisymmetric if
⊕ is commutative.
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14. Algebraic interpretation of NF (C).
DEFINITION 14.1. Let B =< B,⊕ > be a WLA and let µ : C → B. The
structure Bµ =< B,⊕, µ > is said to be a weak Leibniz structure (WLS for
short). The reduct B shall be called the WLA base of Bµ.
Leibniz structures (LS for short), commutative Leibniz structures (CLS
for short) and commutative weak Leibniz structures (CWLS for short) are
defined analogously.
The following definition shows how NF (C) may be interpreted in these
structures. So they may, and will, be considered as NF (C)-structures and
will be treated like other NF (C)-structures when dealing with semantics. In
particular, all semantical notions (such as “Bµ is a (n algebraic) model of Γ”
or “Γ 
C
σ”, for Γ∪{σ} ⊆ BN(C) and C ⊆WLS) will be assumed to be known.
DEFINITION 14.2. Let Bµ =< B,⊕, µ > be a WLS, and let a, b ∈ C, then:
1. Bµ  Aab iff µa⊕ µb exists and equals µa
(iff << µa, µb >, µa >∈ ⊕).
2. Bµ  Iab iff the system of equations x⊕ µa = x,
x⊕ µb = x has a solution
(iff the equation x⊕ µa = x⊕ µb has a solution,
iff the equation x⊕ µa = y ⊕ µb has a solution).
3. Bµ  Eab iff Bµ 2 Iab.
4. Bµ  Oab iff Bµ 2 Aab.
REMARKS 14.3.
1. The order (partial order) model < B,
◦
≤, µ > is basically equivalent to
the WLS (CLS), < B,+ ◦
≤
, µ >.
2. The WLS (CLS), < B,⊕, µ >, is basically equivalent to the order (partial
order) model < B,≤⊕, µ >.
3. Consequently, every WLS (hence every LS, every CWLS and every CLS)
is an e-model for e ∈ {d, d′, d′′, g}.
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4. In the light of remarks and definitions 9.10 it may be easily seen that:
1. For e ∈ {d, d′, d′′, g}, e is sound wrt WLS, hence wrt every subclass
of it.
2. g is CLS-syntactically complete.
3. For e ∈ {d′, d′′, g}, e is CLS-consistently syntactically complete.
4. For e ∈ {d, d′, d′′, g}, e is CLS-consistently semantically complete.
In clauses 2-4, CLS may be replaced by any class intermediate between
it and WLS.
15. Annihilators: Embedding the partial into a total. An anni-
hilator of a (partial) binary operation ∗ on a set B is an element b ∈ B such
that:
x ∗ b = b = b ∗ x all x ∈ B
Obviously ∗ has at most one annihilator.
An annihilator algebra is an ordered triple B =< B, ∗, b > such that the
reduct rB =< B, ∗ > is a partial algebra, and b is an annihilator of ∗.
The subreduct srB of B is the ordered pair < B′, ∗′ >, where:
B′ = B − {b} , ∗′ = ∗ ∩ (B′ × B′)× B′
Here, and in the sequel, B′ is assumed to be non-empty.
DEFINITIONS 15.1.
1. An annihilator Leibniz algebra (ALA for short) is an annihilator alge-
bra whose subreduct is a LA.
Annihilator commutative Leibniz algebras (ACLA for short), annihilator
weak Leibniz algebras (AWLA for short) and annihilator commutative weak
Leibniz algebras (ACWLA for short) are defined analogously.
2. A Leibniz algebra with annihilator (LAA for short) is an annihilator
algebra whose reduct is a LA.
Commutative Leibniz algebras with annihilators (CLAA for short), weak
Leibniz algebras with annihilators (WLAA for short) and commutative weak
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Leibniz algebras with annihilators (CWLAA for short) are defined analo-
gously.
As usual, an algebra or a structure based on an algebra is said to be total
if each of its operations is total. “TLA” will stand for “total Leibniz algebra”,
“TLS” will stand for “total Leibniz structure” and similarly for the other cases.
REMARKS 15.2.
1. The subreduct of an annihilator algebra is a LA (respectively CLA,
WLA or CWLA) if the reduct is.
Hence LAA ⊆ ALA, and similarly for the other cases.
2. Let B =< B, ∗, b > be a total annihilator algebra whose subreduct
also is total. Then B is LAA iff it is ALA; “LA” may be replaced by “CLA”,
“WLA” or “CWLA”.
3. TCLAA = TCWLAA = ICSGA (idempotent commutative
semigroups with annihilators)
= OSLA (operational semilattices
with annihilators)
The order structures induced by these algebras are lower semilattices with
smallest elements.
In the above equations “C”, the last “A” or both, may be dropped every-
where (the corresponding parenthetic clause is to be modified accordingly).
The following definition designates to each partial algebra a total annihi-
lator algebra in which it may be embedded.
DEFINITION and remarks 15.3.
1. For i ∈ 2, let Bi(=< Bi, ∗i >) be a partial algebra. A bijection f from
B0 to B1 is said to be an isomorphism fromB0 to B1 if for every x, y, z ∈ B0:
<< x, y >, z >∈ ∗0 iff << fx, fy >, fz >∈ ∗1.
B0 and B1 are said to be isomorphic if there is an isomorphism from one
of them to the other.
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2. If two partial algebras are isomorphic and one of the partial binary
operations has an annihilator, then its image is an annihilator of the other.
3. Two annihilator algebras are said to be isomorphic if their reducts are.
4. Two total annihilator algebras are isomorphic iff their subreducts are.
5. Every partial algebra B(=< B, ∗ >) is the subreduct of some total
annihilator algebra. For, let 0 /∈ B and 0B = B ∪ {0}.
Put:
0 ∗ : 0B × 0B → 0B
x 0 ∗ y =
{
x ∗ y if < x, y >∈ Domain ∗,
0 otherwise
Then 0B(=< 0B, 0∗, 0 >) is a total annihilator algebra, and B is its
subreduct.
6. Every total annihilator algebra whose subreduct is isomorphic to B, is
isomorphic to 0B. This warrants calling 0B the total annihilator algebra
induced by B.
The identity map on B is an embedding of B into 0B.
7. 0B is a TALA iff B is a LA. “LA” may be replaced by “CLA”, “WLA”
or “CWLA”.
16. Back to algebraic interpretation. Let B(=< B, ∗, 0 >) be a
WLAA, then its reduct rB(=< B, ∗ >) is a WLA. So < B, ∗, µ > is a WLS,
for every µ : C → B. Obviously, for all a, b ∈ C, Iab is satisfied in this
structure. Hence none of d, d′, d′′ nor g is consistently semantically complete
wrt any class of such structures, though every one of them is sound wrt each
of these classes. Evidently expanding the structure to < B, ∗, 0, µ > will not
solve the problem.
As a matter of fact, the annihilator is the source of the difficulty, and we
may get around it by not permitting the annihilator to be assigned as a value
corresponding to any element of C, nor accepting it as a solution of any of
the relevant equations below. An additional advantage of this approach is to
be able to consider the more general AWLA.
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DEFINITION 16.1. (non-annihilator interpretation of NF (C) in annihilator
algebras)
1. Let B(=< B, ∗, 0 >) be an AWLA and let µ : C → B′(= B − {0}).
The structure Bµ(=< B, ∗, 0, µ >) is called an annihilator weak Leibniz
structure (AWLS for short). The reduct B of Bµ is called the AWLA base
of Bµ.
The structures based on the other algebras (total or not) are defined, and
their names are abbreviated, analogously.
2. For each a, b ∈ C:
1. Bµ  Aab iff µa ∗ µb exists and equals µa
(equivalently << µa, µb >, µa >∈ ∗).
2. Bµ  Iab iff the system of equations x ∗ µa = x,
x ∗ µb = x has a solution different from 0
(iff the equation x ∗ µa = x ∗ µb
has a solution which makes x ∗ µb 6= 0,
iff the equation x ∗ µa = y ∗ µb
has a solution which makes y ∗ µb 6= 0).
3. Bµ  Eab iff Bµ 2 Iab.
4. Bµ  Oab iff Bµ 2 Aab.
This shows how NF (C) may be interpreted in the structures defined in
part 1. So they may, and will, be considered as NF (C)-structures and will be
treated like other NF (C)-structures when dealing with semantics. In partic-
ular, all semantical notions (such as “Bµ is a (total algebraic) model of Γ” or
“Γ C σ”, for Γ∪{σ} ⊆ BN(C) and C ⊆AWLS) will be assumed to be known.
REMARKS 16.2.
1. Bµ and srBµ are basically equivalent, hence every AWLS is an e-model
for e ∈ {d, d′, d′′, g}.
2. In part 4 of remarks 14.3, “WLS” and “CLS” may be, respectively,
replaced by “TAWLS” and “TACLS”.
3. If Bµ is a TCLSA (equivalently TCWLSA), the provisions given in
part 2 of definitions 16.1 may be simplified in the obvious way; in particular,
the second provision will be equivalent to µa ∗ µb 6= 0.
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To investigate the relationship between TCLSA and the Venn models we
make use of a (n intermediate) subclass of TCLSA, namely the subclass of
those TCLSA based on OSLA which are reducts of Boolean algebras.
These reducts will be called Boolean-Leibniz algebras with annihilators,
BLAA for short. As usual BLSA is a Boolean-Leibniz structure with anni-
hilator, i.e. a LSA based on a BLAA.
PROPOSITION 16.3. Every TCLAA may be embedded in a BLAA.
Proof. Let B(=< B, ∗, 0 >) be a TCLAA. The mapping:
f : B → ℘(B)
f(b) = {x ∈ B : x ∗ b = x} − {0}
is an embedding ofB in the BLAA:< ℘(B),∩, φ >. 
< ℘(B),∩, φ > will be called the BLAA corresponding to B and will be
denoted by “Bl(B)”. For µ : C → B, < ℘(B),∩, φ, fµ > is a BLSA; it will
be called the BLSA corresponding to, the TCLSA, Bµ and will be denoted
by “Bl(Bµ)”. The relevant definitions and part 3 of remarks 16.2 show that
B
µ and Bl(Bµ) are basically equivalent.
THEOREM 16.4. Every TCLSA is basically equivalent to a Venn model. And
every Venn model is basically equivalent to a BLSA (hence to a TCLSA);
moreover, the BLSA may be assumed to be based on a concrete BLAA whose
universe is a power set.
Proof. Let Bµ(=< B, ∗, 0, µ >) be a TCLSA, then Bl(Bµ) is a BLSA and
B
′ =< ℘(B)−{φ}, fµ > is a Venn model. They all are basically equivalent.
On the other hand, letB(=< B, µ >) be a Venn model, then< ℘(
⋃
B),∩,
φ, µ > is a BLSA which is basically equivalent to it. 
COROLLARY 16.5. In part 4 of remarks 14.3, “WLS” and “CLS” may be, re-
spectively, replaced by “TWLSA” and “BLSA” (either the superclass TCLSA,
or the subclass consisting of those elements each of which is based on a con-
crete BLAA whose universe is a power set, may replace BLSA). 
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17. Leibniz and Boole. The calculus de continentibus et contentis,
or the calculus of identity and inclusion -which is an algebraic treatment
of concepts- was developed by Leibniz during 1679-90 (Kneale and Kneale
1966, p. 337). As may be gathered from a passage of the same reference
(pp. 340-3), or from a translation of an original text of Leibniz (Lewis 1960,
pp. 297-305), this calculus is the theory of operational semilattices (OSL
for short) with applications to concepts; commutativity and idempotence
are explicitly stated, while associativity is implicitly taken for granted (the
aforementioned passage is abbreviated with some slight changes from the
aforementioned translation (Kneale and Kneale 1966, p. 343); notice that
the edition of Lewis’ book referred to in Kneale and Kneale (1966) is earlier
than the one referred to above).
Kneale and Kneale (1966)’s assessment of this calculus is unfavorable.
It asserts (p. 337) that Leibniz “intended, no doubt, to produce something
wider than traditional logic. [...]. But [...] he never succeeded in producing a
calculus which covered even the whole theory of syllogism.”. On p. 345 this
assertion is elaborated “What he [Leibniz] produced was certainly much less
than he hoped to produce. For the last scheme [the calculus de continentibus
et contentis], lacking as it does any provision for negation or for consideration
of conjunction and disjunction together, is still a fragment. So far from
including all Aristotle’s syllogistic theory as a part, it contains no principle
of syllogism except the first [...]”.
Likewise, Lenzen (2004)’s assessment of the calculus de continentibus et
contentis is unfavorable. It asserts (p. 28) that this calculus “remains a very
weak and uninteresting system [...]; thus it shall no longer be considered
here.”.
On the contrary, we have shown that neither negation (of terms) nor any
additional operations are needed to algebraically interpret AAS. It suffices
to require the OSL to possess an annihilator, i.e. to be OSLA. For the
structures based on the OSLA are the TCLSA and, by corollary 16.5, AAS
is both sound and complete with respect to them.
According to Kneale and Kneale (1966, p. 339) it may be seen that
Leibniz practically introduced annihilators when he interpreted Eab as ab
(µa ∗ µb, in our terminology) is nothing.
Lenzen (2004) goes even further. It (pp. 2-3) asserts that Leibniz devel-
oped stronger calculi, the most important of them (p.3) “is L1, the full algebra
of concepts [...], L1 is deductively equivalent or isomorphic to the ordinary
algebra of sets. Since Leibniz happened to provide a complete set of axioms
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for L1, he “discovered” the Boolean algebra 160 years before Boole.”.
Moreover, Lenzen (2004) asserts that Leibniz succeeded in making use of
his logical theory to derive the basic laws of Aristotelian syllogism (p. 55).
In particular, the Aristotelian inferences may be derived as theorems of L1,
or the stronger calculus L2 (p. 56); a detailed discussion of the subject may
be found in Lenzen (2004, §8, pp. 55-73). Indeed, as we have shown, AAS
does not need all of this.
Boole did more than just algebraically interpreting AAS. In addition
to annihilators, which are sufficient for dealing with Aristotelian syllogisms
(which involve no term negation), he introduced complementation (which
corresponds to term negation) and a second binary operation. This is possi-
bly to:
1. be able to interpret all the Aristotelian categorical sentences into
equations (cf. Boole 1948, pp. 20-5),
2. deal with medieval categorical sentences which may involve term nega-
tion (cf. Boole 1948, pp. 20, 27-47), or
3. deal with hypotheticals (cf. Boole 1948, pp. 48-59).
In addition to establishing the Aristotelian syllogistic rules, Boole (1948)
established some non-Aristotelian ones. For example (p. 37) Ezy,Oyx
Ox′z
, where
“x′” denotes “not-x”.
Boole (1948) did not address the question of completeness, neither did
he consider consequences of more than two premises. However, it discussed
(pp. 76-81) a general scheme to solve arbitrarily finite systems of simultane-
ous equations in arbitrarily finitely many variables; applying, in particular,
Lagrange’s method of indeterminate multipliers. This discussion took place
after making (p. 18) the confounding assertion “[...] all the processes of
common algebra are applicable to the present [Boolean] system.”.
For one more confounding assertion see below.
18. Inadequacy: bounds of AAs. Calling the symbols of its system
“elective symbols” (p. 16), Boole (1948) makes (p. 59) another confounding
assertion: “Every Proposition which language can express may be represented
by elective symbols, and the laws of combination of those symbols are in all
cases the same; but in one class of instances the symbols have reference to
collections of objects, in the other, to the truths of constituent Proposition.”.
This, probably, amounts -in modern language- to asserting: Every proposi-
tion which language can express is equivalent to a sentential combination of
categorical sentences (SCCS for short).
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SCCS should be taken seriously, since a stronger assertion has dominated
human thought over more than two millennia: Every argument can be put
in a syllogistic form. Even Bertrand Russell (1967, p. 198) asserts “Of course
it would be possible to re-write mathematical arguments in syllogistic form,
but this would be very artificial and would not make them any more cogent.”.
Concerning these assertions, it is worthwile to bring to the fore what
Bocheński (1968) calls attention to. On p. 63 it observes that Artistotle “says
explicitly that not all logical entailment is “Syllogistic”.”. Moreover it observes
on the same page that Aristotle declares that some logical entailments cannot
be reduced to syllogisms. So it may be concluded that Artistotle himself
contradicts the aforementioned assertions of Boole and Russell, which makes
making them deeply confounding, and makes it more urgent for historians of
thought to investigate the matter.
Understanding SCCS depends on understanding the notion of categorical
sentences. If term negation is permitted, the sentences will be called “Boolean
categorical sentences” and the corresponding assertion will be denoted by
“SCBCS”. Otherwise, the sentences will be called “Aristotelian categorical
sentences” and the corresponding assertion will be denoted by “SCACS”.
Hilbert and Ackermann (1950) formalizes the Boolean categorical sen-
tences (pp. 44-8) and informally refutes SCBCS (pp. 55-6).
To formally discuss SCACS (making use only of the methods developed
above and the well known results of sentential logic) augment the alphabet
of the language C of the natural deduction formalization defined in section
1.4 above, by a ternary relation symbol E ′, and add E ′abc (a, b, c ∈ C) to the
set of sentences based on C. Denote the new set of sentences by “BN ′(C)”.
Intuitively, we like E ′abc to mean that no a which is b, is c. This may be
formalized as follows:
Interpret BN ′(C) in a WLS Bµ =< B, ∗, µ > by adding the following
provision to the provisions of definition 14.2.
5. Bµ  E ′abc iff the system of equations: x ∗ µa = x,
x ∗ µb = x and x ∗ µc = x has no solution.
In an AWLS Bµ =< B, ∗, 0, µ >, BN ′(C) is interpreted by adding the
following provision to the provisions of part 2 of definitions 16.1.
5. Bµ  E ′abc iff 0 is the only solution of the system
of equations: x ∗ µa = x, x ∗ µb = x
and x ∗ µc = x.
Recall that 0 is not in the range of µ; also notice that if Bµ is a TCLSA,
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then this provision is equivalent to
5′. µa ∗ µb ∗ µc = 0.
The other syntactical and semantical notions remain the same, or to be
appropriately modified in the obvious way.
Let Γ0,Γ1 ⊆ BN
′(C) and let D ⊆WLS ∪AWLS. Γ0 is said to D-imply
Γ1 (symbolically Γ0 
D
Γ1) if for every D ∈ D, D  Γ1 whenever D  Γ0.
Γ0 is said to be D-equivalent to Γ1, or Γ0,Γ1 are D-equivalent, if each of
them D-implies the other. Γ0 is said to be D-valid if φ 
D
Γ0, it is said to be
D-consistent if D  Γ0 for some D ∈ D.
The above notions may be generalized, in the obvious way, to sets of
sentential combinations of elements of BN ′(C). If Γ0 or Γ1 is a singleton, it
may be replaced by its unique element, e.g. “ρ 
D
σ” may replace “{ρ} 
D
{σ}”.
In what follows c0, c1 and c2 are assumed to be pairwise distinct elements
of C. For every D ⊆WLS∪AWLS, Ec0c1 D-implies E
′c0c1c2. The converse
depends on D. In particular it does not hold for D = BLSA. As a matter
of fact we have the following:
THEOREM 18.1. Let σ be a sentential combination of elements of BN(C),
then:
1. E ′c0c1c2 is not BLSA-equivalent to σ, hence
2. E ′c0c1c2 is not deductively equivalent to σ (i.e. one of them does not
deductively entail the other), for each deductive system which is sound with
respect to BLSA.
To prove this, we first prove:
LEMMA 18.2. Put:
Γ0 = {Ic0c1, Ic1c2, Ic2c0} and Γ1 = Γ0 ∪ {E
′c0c1c2}
then:
1. Γ1 is BLSA-consistent.
2. Γ1 is not BLSA-implied by any BLSA-consistent Γ ⊆ BN(C).
Proof. Part 1 is easy. To see part 2, assume that there is a subset Γ ⊆
BN(C) which is both BLSA-consistent and BLSA-implies Γ1. Then there
is Bµ ∈ BLSA which is a model of Γ ∪ Γ1. By theorem 16.4 it may be
assumed that Bµ =< ℘(B),∩, φ, µ > for some B.
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Let B′ = B∪{a} for some a /∈ B and let B′µ
′
=< ℘(B′),∩, φ, µ′ > where
for every c ∈ C,
µ′(c) =
{
µ(c) ∪ {a} if Bµ  Acic for some i ∈ 3,
µ(c) otherwise.
B
′µ′ is a BLSA which is basically equivalent to Bµ, hence it is a model of
Γ; but it is not a model of Γ1. From this the required follows. 
Proof of theorem 18.1. Assume that E ′c0c1c2 is BLSA-equivalent to a sen-
tential combination of elements of BN(C), σ say. Then E ′c0c1c2 ∧ Ic0c1 ∧
Ic1c2∧ Ic2c0 (ρ for short) is BLSA-equivalent to σ∧ Ic0c1∧ Ic1c2∧ Ic2c0 (σ1
for short) which also is a sentential combination of elements of BN(C).
By sentential logic, σ1 may be assumed to be a disjunction of conjunc-
tions of elements of BN(C) and their negations. Since ρ is BLSA-consistent
and the negation of any element of BN(C) is BLSA-equivalent to some ele-
ment of BN(C), σ1 may further be assumed to be a non-empty disjunction
of BLSA-consistent conjunctions of elements of BN(C). Consequently ρ is
BLSA-implied by each of these conjunctions, which contradicts part 2 of
lemma 18.2. From this the required follows. 
Acknowledgements. Several friends were kind enough to provide me
with references which proved to be very helpful. My deep gratitude is hereby
expressed to each of them: Wafik Lotfalla, Essawy Amasha, Sharon Amasha,
and Fawzy Hegab. I am most indebted to two more friends: Azza Khalifa for
pointing out some misprints, and Ahmed Ghaleb for patiently and carefully
proofreading the manuscript and transforming its scientific Workplace file
into TEX.
Appendix. The following algorithm, to generate the first n(> 0) primes,
may not be efficient, but it is simple, and its running time (see below) makes
it sufficient for our purposes.
Input: n (positive integer)
Output: p (the strictly increasing list of the first n primes)
Procedure:
Declare i, j, k,m natural number parameters;
p0 ← 2;
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If n = 1 go to ∗ ∗ ∗
Else p1 ← 3, i← 1, m← 2
End If;
For1 i < n− 1 do
k ← pi + 2, m← mpi
For2 k ≤ m+ 1 do
j ← 0
For3 j ≤ i do
If pj|k go to ∗
Else j ← j + 1
End If;
Repeat
End For3;
∗ If j > i go to ∗∗
Else k ← k + 2
End If;
Repeat
End For2;
∗∗ i← i+ 1
pi ← k
Repeat
End For1;
∗ ∗ ∗ Print p;
End Algorithm.
The termination of this algorithm is guaranteed by the respective upper
bounds stipulated at the beginnings of the three For loops. The correctness
is guaranteed by the well known fact which goes back to Euclid’s Elements:
pi+1 ≤ 1+
i
Π
j=0
pj , together with the simple fact that pi+1 is the first (odd)
integer greater than pi, which is not a multiple of any of p0, ..., pi.
To estimate the running time, notice that (Landau 1958, p. 91) for large
n, pn < n
2. For such n the For1 loop is iterated at most n times, for each
iteration the For2 loop is iterated at most n
2 times, and for each of these
iterations the For3 loop is iterated at most n times. All the steps of the
algorithm are simple assignment or comparison steps, the only exception is
the test pi|k which needs at most k (≤ n
2) simple steps. So the total running
time is a polynomial in n, of degree at most 1 + 2 + 1 + 2 = 6.
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